UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

2-21-2008

Scott Beckstead Real Estate Co. v. City of Preston
Clerk's Record v. 2 Dckt. 34644

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Scott Beckstead Real Estate Co. v. City of Preston Clerk's Record v. 2 Dckt. 34644" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs.
1704.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1704

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

UME 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME 1
Complaint filed 9-8-06

1

First Amended Complaint filed 12-11-06

3

Order for Status and Scheduling Conference filed 1-10-0

3

Answer to First Amended Complaint filed 2-28-07

2

Second Amended Complaint filed 5-15-07........................................................................................................ 58
Order Granting Leave to Amend Complaint filed 5-15-0
Minute Entry & Order filed 5-17-07
Answer to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint filed 5-23-0
Order Extending Time for Motions for Summaly Judgment filed 5-29-07 ........................................................ 97
Motion for Summary Judgment filed 6-20-07
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment filed 6-22-07
Motion for Summary Judgment filed 6-21-07
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment filed 6-21-07 ..................................... 133
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed 6-21-07 ................................ 154
Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed 6-21-07............ 174

TABLE OF CONTENTS - 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME 2

Affidavit of John Balls in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed 6-21-07....................199
Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed 6-21-07 ............201
Affidavit of Clyde G. Nelson in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed 6-21-07 ..........207
Minute Entry & Order filed 7-2-07

216

Order for Trial, Pretrial Schedule, and Pretrial Conference filed 7-5-07

218

Order to Continue Trial filed 7-12-07

223

Reply Memorandum to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed 7-23-07

225

Second Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn in Support of Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment .....................................................................................................

233

Supplementary Affidavit of Clyde G. Nelson in Support of Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgmen

235

Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed 7-23-07

237

Beckstead's Second Affidavit in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment fiied 7-24-07.... 261
Second Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen In Response to Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment fiied 7-25-07 ................... .
.
...........

............................................................ 268

Third Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn in Response to Plaintiffs Reply to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment filed 7-25
Beckstead's Third Affidavit in Response to Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
filed 7-26-0

270

Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed 8-16-07.............................................................................274
Judgment filed 8-16-07
Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees filed 8-24-07
Objectior; to Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees filed 9-6-0
Notice of Appeal filed 9-25-0
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal filed 10-1-07
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for and Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees
filed 10-4-0
Minute Entry and Order filed 10-22-0

TABLE OF CONTENTS - 3

13
25

TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME 2 -Continued

Memorandum Decision and Order Denying in Part and Granting in Part Defendant's Motion for Costs and
Attorney Fees filed 10-30-07

327

Amended Judgment filed 10-30-07

334

Notice of Cross-Appeal filed 11-2-0

336

Amended Notice of Appeal filed 12-10-0

352

Second Amended Clerk's Certificate of Appeal filed 12-10-07

357

TABLE OF CONTENTS - 4

INDEX
VOLUME 1
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment filed 6-21-07............................................

101

Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgmentfiled 6-21-07............ 174
Answer to First Amended Complaint filed 2-2807
Answer to Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint
Complaint filed 9-8-06

1

First Amended Complaint filed 12-11-06

3

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed 6-21-07 ................................ 154
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment filed 6-21-07 ..................................... 133
Minute Entry & Order filed 5-17-07
Motion for Summary Judgment file
Motion for Summary Judgment filed 6-21-07 .............................................................................................

131

Order Extending Time for Motions for Summary Judgment filed 5-29-07

97

Order for Status and Scheduling Conference filed 1-10-07

33

Order Granting Leave to Amend Complaint filed 5-15-0

77

Second Amended Complaint filed 5-15-07........................................................................................................ 58

INDEX
VOLUME 2
Affidavit of Clyde G. Nelson in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed 6-21-07 .......... 207
Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed 6-8-07 ............201
Affidavit of John Balls in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed 6-21-07 .................... 199
Amended Judgment filed 10-30-07

334

Amended Notice of Appeal filed 12-10-07....................................................................................................... 352
Beckstead's Second Affidavit in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed 7-24-07 .... 261
Beckstead's Third Affidavit in Response to Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
filed 7-26-0
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal filed 10-1-07
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for and Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees
filed 10-4-07.................................................................................................................................................

313

Judgment filed 8-16-07

81

Memorandum Decision and Order Denying in Part and Granting in Part Defendant's Motion for Costs and
Attorney Fees filed 10-30-0

27

Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment filed 8-16-0

274

Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed 7-23-07 ..........................

237

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed 6-21-07 ............................

178

Minute Entry & Order filed 7-2-07

216

Minute Entry and Order filed 10-22-0

325

Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees filed 8-24-07

283

Notice of Appeal filed 9-25-07

308

Notice of Cross-Appeal filed 11-2-07

336

Objection to Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees filed 9-6-07 ..................................................300
Order for Trial, Pretrial Schedule, and Pretrial Conference filed 7-5-07 .........................................................218
Order to Continue Trial filed 7-12-07 .............................................................................................................

223

Reply Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment filed 7-23-07

225

Second Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn in Support of Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgmen

233

Second Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen in Response to Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment filed 7-25-07 .............................................................................................................................

268

INDEX
VOLUME 2 -Continued

Second Amended Clerk's Certificate of Appeal filed 12-10-07

357

Supplementary Affidavit of Clyde G. Nelson in Support of Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment

235

Third Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn in Response to Plaintiffs Reply to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment filed 7-25

269(a)

CLYDE G. NELSON
Attorney at Law
172 South Main Street
P.O. BOX 797
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Telephone: (208) 547-2135
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136
Idaho State Bar No. 1197
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE,
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,
and Scott Beckstead, Individually
Plaintiff,
vs .

1
)
)
)
)
)
)

CITY OF PRESTON,
Defendant.

...................................

1
1

CASE NO. CV-2006-390
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN BALLS
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

)
)
.)
)

COMES NOW John Balls, upon oath duly deposes and says:
1.

I am the Director of Public Works for the City of Preston, Idaho.

2.

1 have worked for the City of Preston, Idaho, for a period in excess of five years,
and am fully familiar with the Creamery Hollow Subdivision, and the waterline
improvements constructed by Beckstead on 800 East Street.

3.

1 have measured the length of the 12-inch waterline installed by Beckstead on 800
East Street. It is 1, 650 feet long, not 1,700 feet long as clailned by Mr.
Beckstead.

4.

The cost to the city for connections to the waterline in 2004 was an average of
$2,618.07 for each connection. The cost of connections in 2007 averages
$3,349.40 per connection. Darrell Wilburn, City Engineer, Jerry Larsen, City
Clerk, and I computed those figures, and they are based upon material costs, costs
of labor, costs of use of equipment, supervision, and costs of administration. (See
Exhibit B to Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn.)

$
DATED thisyad&

of June, 2007.

AAB&

to before me this & day of b

e

,2007

k.
lZ0R.A

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at P
10
Comm. Expires
7 - 15.aolo

CLYDE G. NELSON
Attorney at Law
172 South Main Street
P.O. Box 797
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Telephone: (208) 547-2135
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136
Idaho State Bar No. 1197
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE,
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,
and Scott Beckstead, Individually
Plaintiff,

vs .

)
)
)
)
)

1

CITY OF PRESTON,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2006-390
AFFIDAVIT OF DARRELL
WILBURN IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1
)

COMES NOW Darrell Wilbum, upon oath duly deposes and says:
1.

I was the City Engineer for the City of Preston, Idaho, during all periods relevant
to the action filed by the Plaintiff Scott Becltstead, and retired from my position
with the City in 2007.

2.

I know Scott Beckstead, and am fully familiar with the Creamery Hollow
Subdivision.

3.

Pursuant to § 16.28, Preston Municipal Code, a subdivider is required to have at
least a 6-inch water main supplying his subdivision.

4.

Scott Becltstead had three alternatives for connecting a 6-inch line to city water
mains at the time he developed the subdivision. He could have either:

1. Waited until the City completed its 10-inch waterloop project.
2. Replace 1,000 feet of existing 4-inch water main with a 6-inch water main on

Oneida Street.
3. Extend the existing 6-inch water main on 800 East Street a distance of 16501700 feet.
Mr. Beckstead chose Option 3
Creamery Hollow Subdivision has 22 lots which were benefitted from the
installation of the waterline improvements along 800 East Street.
The City decided to "oversize" the 6-inch waterline to a 12-inch waterline.
Beckstead asserted he had installed a total of 1,700 feet of 12-inch line. Of this,
460 feet were supplied by the City of Preston, and Beckstead would have supplied
1,240 feet.
After completion of the improvements in October, 2003, Scott Martin, Director of
Public Works, and 1 computed the aniount that Mr. Beckstead would be
reimbursed. I prepared a document showing the anlount of reimbursement to be
$7,461.00. A copy of said document is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit " A .
It is my understanding that Beckstead was reimbursed for the "oversizing".
The cost to the City for labor and materials for installation of a service connection
in 2004 was an average of $2,618.07. The cost for a connection in 2007 is an
average of $3,349.40. I computed the figures in the cost of connection of a
service line with the assistance of John Balls, present Director of Public Works,
and Jeny Larsen, City Clerk. A summary of those costs is attached hereto as
Exhibit "B".
In October, 2004, Beckstead discussed with me possible reimbursement for the
intervening connections which had been made to the waterline. I did not advise
him that this was the type of situation for which §16.28.030B was written or '
suggest that he request reimbursement from the City as alleged in 79 of Plaintiffs
Complaint. I merely told him that if he thought he had a claim he should discuss
it with the City Clerk. Beckstead did not advise me of the labor or materials which
he allegedly had furnished or the amount he thought was owing.

I am personally aware that only five additional connections have been made by
intervening property owners since the construction of the waterline. Of these, four
were made in October, 2004, and one was made in November, 2004.
Never, at any time during the filing of the preliminary plat, filing of the final plat,
recording of the same, or during the period that Beckstead constructed the 800
East improven~ents,until one year later in October, 2004, did Beckstead ever
mention §16.28.030B, Preston Municipal Code, or ever state to me that he might
be entitled to reimbursement for intervening connections.

k

DATED this E d a y of June, 2007.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

f i&day of

-

Creamery Hollow Subdivision 0111 East Water Line
Item
Description
1 Subdividers Plpe
2 City Supplied Pipe
3 Valves
4 Saddre & Tap

Differences

Quanity

1240
460
0
0

6" Unit"

$3.27
$3.27
$356.66

$433.85

12" Cost
Difference
$10.50 $4,054.00 $13,020.00 $8,865.20
$0.00 $1,504.20
$0.00 ($1,504.20)
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
. $0.00
$0.00
$0.00

12" Unit 6" Cost

'

2004

Residential Water Connactjon Fee
Cost Anayeis

Per Hwr
Rev&
. .- .-

Application & Account

Qlranrty

$27.15

1

S27.15

.

PW D i m t a r
City Engineer

Equipment

Hr. Rate

Bsck Hoe
Dump Truck

Hr.

875.50
333.00
$76.50
545.00
$31.50
818.00
$48.50
$6.00 .
39.00
$63.00

Loader

Service Truck
Pickup
Asphalt saw
'
Jack Hammer & Compressor
Hole s w
Tapping tools
Patch Tmck
Compacior
Hand tools 8 Persona! Equip

$18.00
sg.00 t ea

Labor

Superviscr
Licenced Water Operators
Roadway w r k a r s
Traffic Ccr,trcller
Backhoe operator
Loader Oparatcr

5
4
1

4
4
1
i

0.5
0.5
3
0.5

527.15
327.15
527.15

4
6

St7.15

1

527.15

5
f

'l

$27.15

Materials
Gravel

Is

Asphat Patch
Is
Meter Assemble ( 1 )
Is
S%N~C
Line
~ (1)
Is
Conn-n
fitting (1)
Is
Miscellanious shop materialsk
Freight
!a

4 CY

ICY
1 ea
t ea
1 ea
1 ea
1 ea

Total

$44.00
S60.00
$270.07
S99.00
$125.C6

525.00
$50.00

92.61 8.07

EXHIBIT "B-1"
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,:e

:Qt

Lccz/Ltjb?

ResiderrMI Water Conneeljon Fee

Cast AnsJysis
Per Hour

Review

Application 8 Account

W.17

1

$30.17

P W Dtrector

$30.t 7
$48.00

0.5
0.5

$15.08
524.50

Civ Engineer

Equipment

Hr Rsta

Back Hoe
Dump Tru&

Hr.

$85.00
870.00
. $85.00
$50.00

Loader
Service Truck

Labor

auanity

.

Pickup

$35.50

Asphait saw
Jack Hammer & Ccmpresso~
Hole ssw
Tapping took
Patch T ~ c k
Compactor
Hand toals 8 Pemnal Equip

SZ0.W
~5.00
510.00
S10.00
STO.00
520.00
$10.00 1ea

Supervisor
Licsnced Water Operators
Roadway workers
TrafficController
Backhoe operator
Loader Operator

$30.17
S30.77
530.17
$30.17
530.17
$30.17

Materials

Gravel

Is

Asphait Patch

Is

4 CY
1 9
1 ea

Meter h s s m b i e ( I )
IS
Service Line (1)
Is
Conneaon Mng (1)
Is
Miscelianious 6hop rnaierialsls
Frei~ht
:s

lea
I ea
1 ea
1 ea
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CLYDE G. NELSON
Attorney at Law
172 South Main Street
P.0. BOX 797
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Telephone: (208) 547-2135
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136
Idaho State Bar No. 1197

07 JUN 2 1 hlf fa: 2 1
;.. ,..
,, ~

, \ ~ ~ . ; ,8:,<:;,,?;;-c'y'
~-~;:
CLERK

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE,
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE,
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,
and Scott Beckstead, Individually
Plaintiff,

vs .

CITY OF PRESTON,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)

CASE NO. CV-2006-390
AFFIDAVIT OF CLYDE G .
NELSON IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMNARY JUDGMENT

)
)
)

COMES NOW Clyde G. Nelson, upon oath duly deposes and says:
1.

I am the attorney for the City of Preston, Idaho and have served continuously in
that position since the early 1990's.

2.

I know Scott Beckstead and sun familiar with the Creamery Hollow Subdivision.

3.

Tltere are 22 lots within the Creamery Hollow Subdivision. The Plaintiff
Beckstead has sold all lots within the subdivision. (Answer to Interrogatory No. 8,
Answers to Defendant's Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents,
Exhibit "A", attached hereto).

4.

The Plaintiff Beckstead has made a profit from the sale of his lots within the
subdivision after taking in to account all expenses and costs associated with the
development of the subdivision, including the costs of installing the pipeline on
800 East Street. (Supplemental Answer to Interrogatory No. 9, PlaintifPs
Supplemental Answer to Defendant's Interrogatories and Request for Production
of Documents, Exhibit "B" attached hereto)

5.

Beckstead was fully aware of the amounts that he had expended for installation,
materials, and labor of the 800 East waterline as he had received a bill from
Irrigation Aid Co. for 1,060 feet of 12-inch pipeline dated November 4,2003, an
invoice from WR White Supply for 180 feet of 12-inch pipeline dated October 27,
2003, and a bill from Gary's Backhoe Service for excavation work and back-fill
dated November 10, 2003. Said docunents were submitted by Plaintiff in
Respo~lseto Defendant's Request for Production of Documents aiid are attached
hereto as Exhibit "C".

DATED this &day

of June, 2007

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
,,\\\lD'~~'1111/

,,,,,

f i day o
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Notary Public fod Idaho
Residing at Grace
Cornm. Expires /a'($'20/2-

INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Please state the number of lots located within
Creamery Hollow Subdivision that you have sold, the name, address and telephone
number of each person to whom you have sold the same, the sales price of each lot to

'

that person, and the total sum you have received for sale of said lots.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Plaintiffs object to Interrogatory No. 8
as requesting information that is irrelevant and immaterial and not leading to
information within the scope of this form of discovery. Further, revealing the actual
purchase price paid for each lot would require divulging information that would be
considered confidential by the Buyers of such lots. Without waiving said objection,
Plaintiff answers as follows:

Lot #

1
2
3

Tel. #

Buyer

-

James White 44 South 600 East, Preston, Idaho

1 Larry Ralphs - 85 West Hwy, Clifton, ID
I Layne Harris - 136 North I5'West, Preston, ID

852-0532
747-3737

1 852-1528

4

Dean lnman - 621 East 145 South, Preston, ID

not listed

5

Sheldon coburn - 9313 North Hwy 34, Preston, ID

852-1519

6

Dean lnman 621 East 145 South Preston, ID

7

Vince Whitehead 85 West Is'
South, Clifton, ID

747-3782

8

Richard Nuffer - 615 East 60 South, Preston, ID

852-2758

9

Ross Smith - 69 North I" East, Preston, ID

852-1449

10

John Burg - 624 East 60 South, Preston, ID

852-2784

11

Vince Whitehead 85 West 1" South, Clifton, ID

12

Steve Foster 103 N. Bear River Bluff, Preston, ID

13

-

-

-

-

not listed

747-3782

-

852-0689

Ken Morrison Unknown, Salt Lake City, UT

-

unlisted

14

Jess EIgan -27 North 100 West, Preston, ID

852-0240

15

Vinoe Whitehead 85 West 1" South, Clifton, ID

747-3782

16

Vince Whitehead - 85 West Is' South, Clifton, ID

747-3782

-

Answers of Defendant's interrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents

E X H I B I T "A-1"

Page - 8

l
"

17

Layne Nielson - 131 South 600 East, Preston, ID

18

Dean lnman 621 East 145 South, Preston, ID

not listed

19

Todd Garbett- 643 East 145 South, Preston, ID

852-5779

20

Cameron Whitehead 650 East 145 South, Preston. ID

852-0164

21

Michael Rawlings - 624 East 145 South, Preston, ID

852-1984

22

Lewis Brown 173 South 600 East, Preston, ID 83263

-

-

-

EXHIBIT "A-2"

852-3032

852-1564

-

STEVEN R. FULLER 2995
Steven R. Fuller Law Office
24 North State
P.O.Box 191
Pietton, ID 83263
Telephone: (208) 852-2680
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

SCOTT 0ECKSTEP.D REAL ESTATE
COR/?PANYand SCOTT BECKSTEAD.
an individual,

CASE NO. CV-06-390

Pla:ntiffs,

SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO
DEFENDANT'S 1NTERROGATORlES
AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTlON
OF DOCUMENTS

vs .
CITY OF PRESTON,
Defendant.

I

INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

As part of yoursaies price for purchasers of property
within Creamery i-:ollow Siibdivisian, did you include tbe cost of installation of the waterline
on 8" East Street. If your answer is "yes", please state the amount which you included in
tine lot price as par: of the purchase price for compensation or reimbursement for
installation of said wa:er!ine.

SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9:
--

Although I did not

determine a specific amount as an expense to include in the purchase price of each loi of

Creamery Hollow Subdivision for the installation of the water line o n 600 East, Idid pay all
of the expenses and costs associated with the development of the subdivisian, including

Suppi%mer;talAnswer of Defendant's lnterrogstories and
Requests for Production of Documents

EXHIBIT "B-1"

-

Page I

the costs of installing the pipeline alon(; 830 East, and I did make a profit from the sale of
lots in the subdivision. I also .took into account !hat the Preston City Ordinance provided
for reimbursement of the pipeline costs over a five-year per:od, anticipating that some
water connections would be made to the pipeline I had installed. The City's failure to
reimburse those Costs pursuant to its ordinance had a direct impact on the net profit I
nqticipated from ihe developme~t.

DATED this

&p$gy

of May, 2007.

/

STEVEN R. FULLER
Attorney for Plaintiff

STATE OF IDA30
County of Ftanklin
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, being firs:duly w o r n on oath, deposes and says:

That ha is a Flalnt;ff and repres~ntstivt:of Scoa 6ecics:ead F?eal Estate Company, in the aboveeniit:ed act:on; thathe has reed thcfore~cingComplaintand knows the contents:hereof: ihatthe same is true
of his olAn knowledge except as to matters stated therein on his information and Sciiof and as lo thosa matters
he believes :hem :o be true.

Cticr.

SUBSCRIBED .&ED SWQRN !o baloru me l h i s g d a y ot Pilay, 2007.

Residing at: Preston, Idaho
Comm. Exp.: li21111

Supplemental Answer of Defendant's Interrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents

EXHIBIT "B-2"

-

Page 2

IRRIGATION AID C0MPA.N~ JC.

Invoice

472 No& State
D 83263
Preston, I
Bill To
Beckstead Scott
3?. West Onieida Street
Preston JD.83263

Ship To
32 West Onieida Street
Preston ID. 63263

1

11

EXHIBIT "C-1"

a\3

Subtotal

%11,j64.60

-

04/02/07

.-.

15:15 FAX 801 626

-

7

mITE SUPPLY

U R WHITE SUPPLY
F i le#7247?'-210 BOX 6ROOD

BILL TO:

BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE CO.
32 W. ONEIDA
PRESTON,
ID 83263

SHIP TO:

BECKSTERn REAL ESTATE CO.
800 east 100 north
PRESTON, ID 83263

GARY'S 6ACKH3E SERVICE
4709 W. 1200 N,
ir?AHO 83232
(ZDP,) 747-3243

-

588842

1

1

City, State, Zip

E X H I B I T "6-3"

n

IN THE DISTRICT COURT.OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR'THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

****+"
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,
PlaintiFf(s),

Case No. CV-2006-390

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER
CITY OF PRESTON, a M~~nicipal
Corporation,

BATE:

June 28,2007

APPEARANCES:

Steven R. Fuller, Attorney for Plaintiff
Clyde G. Nelson, Attorney for DeTendant - via telephone

MATTER BEFORE THE COURT: Motion lo Continue
PROCEEDINGS: At the outset the Court heard oral argument from respective counsel
regarding said motion. After consideration the Court GRANTED the motion and ordered
that the Motion for Summary Judgment previously set for July 12Ih shall be moved to July
2dh, 2007 at 1:30 p.m. The parties agreed that a Reply Metnorandurn shall be due July
2?fd.

MINUTE ENTRY'AND ORDER- 1

DATED:

June 28,2007

$J&

DON L, HARDiNG
District Judge

Y
!

I hereby certify that on July 2, 2007, 1 mailed/servedlfaxed a true copy of the
foregoing document on the attorney(s)lperson(s) listed below by mail with correct
postage thereon or causing the same to be hand delivered.
Method of Service:
Steven R. Fuller
Attorney for Plaintiff

Faxed to: 852-2683

Clyde G. i\lelson
Attorney for Defendant

Faxed to: 547-2136

V, ELLIOTT LARSEN, Clerk

BY:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE"'
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN--*****I

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,
Case No. CV-2006-390
ORDER FOR TRIAL, PRETRIAL
SCHEDULE, AND PRETRIAL
CONFERENCE

CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipql

Corporation,

AMENDED

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

* * TRIAL SCIIEDULE ' '
This cause is set for trial schedule as follows:

DATE: January 8-9,2008
PLACE: Franklin County Courthouse
SETTING POSITION:
I
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF DAYS: 2 days

TIME: 9:00 a.m.

*'

PRETRIAL:

-

DATE: December 13,2007
PLACE: Franklin Cotrnty Courthouse

CVEI-ORDER FOR TRIAL, PRETRIAL
SCHEDULE 6. PRETRIAL CONFERENCE 'I

-

I I

' 8

&70 ' n h i

TIME: 1:30 p.m.

;; i:i.,i'{ x;LERX

-

DATED this 28"'day of June, 2007.

&*
DON L. HARDlNG
District Judge

I

CERTIFICATE
OF MAlLlNGlSERVlCE

I hereby certify that on the 3"l day of July, 2007, 1 mailedlserved a trite copy of the
foregolng document on the attorney(s)/person(s) listed below by mail with conect postage
thereon or causing the same to be hand delivered.
Method of Service:
Steven Fuller
Attorney for Plainilff

Faxcd

Clyde Nelson
Attorney for Defendant

Faxed

CVEI-ORDER FOR TRIAL, PRETRIAL
SCHEDULE & PRETPlAL CONFERENCE- 2

* 'APPENDIX A TO TRIAL ORDER"'
1. MULTIPLE SETTINGS:
In the event of multiple settings for the same date and time, it is the responsibility of
counsel to inform tiiemselves of their position upon the trial calendar. In the event a
case cannot be tried on the date indicated, every effort will be made to reset at the
earliest date available to court and the parties.
2. SCHEDULING CONFLICTS;
Requested continuance of trial setting because of pre-existing scheduling conflict
shall be by written motion, state specifically the details of the conflict, and be filed
within 14 davs hereof.
Requests and/or stipiiiations for continuances for other than pre-existing conflicts
must be in writing, state the specific reason therefore, be D r o v e d bv the e m ,
propose mutually agreeable times for rescheduling, and are subject to approval by
the court.

3.SETTLEMENT:
in the event of settiornent of this cause prior to trial, NOTICE SHALL BE GIVEN TO
THE JUDGE AND TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT FORTHWITH. Expenses of
the jury incurred because lack OF reasonable notice will be assessed to the
responsible party or parties.
* * PRE-TRIAL SCHEDULE * "

The pre-trial scheduie for this cause shall be as follows;

-

1.

12 WEEKS BEFORE TRIAL DISCLOSURE QF WITNESSES:
Each party shall disclose in writing to all other parties a complete list of all witnesses,
expert and lay, which that party intends to call at trial, together with a summary of the
testimony of each.

2.

12 WEEKS BEFORE TKlAL -DISCLOSURE OF EXHIBITS:
Each party shall disclose, in writing, to all other parties, and the court, a complete list
of all exhibits, with a summary of the points to be proven, with a copy attached,
which that party Intends to use at trial.

3.

10 WEEKS BEFORE TRIAL DISCOVERY COMPLETION:
All discovery shall be com!ieted. Discovery requests shall have been sewed
sufficiently in advance of this data to require responses to such requests to be Filed
by this date, Motions for compulsion, sanctions andlor extensions will be filed ih
advance of this date.

CVE1-ORDER FOR TRIAL, PRETRIAL
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4.

60 DAYS BEFORE TRIAL - MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT:
I. R. C, P, rule 56(b) shall controi the filina of Motions for Summarv Judament and

briefing schedule.

6.

-

..

-

-

6 WEEKS BEFORE TRIAL MOTION DEADLINE:

Except for motions for summary judgment, as set out above, and motions directly
related to trial procedure, no motions shall be filed after thls date. In addition to other
requirements of tile Rules, or of Orders o i this Court, if any, all motions filed with
this Court must be supported by a memorandum of position and authorities. Adverse
parties shall oppose in the same manner.

-

6.

6 WEEKS BEFORE TRIAL PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE OF PARTIES:
Counsel, and any unrepresented parfy, shall hold a pre-trial conference in an
effort to resolve the action or to prepare a definitive pre-trial order and plan for trial.
Each party shali be prepared to fiiliy discuss each issue and defe~isepresented by
the case, The parties shall fully consider the requirements of I.R.C.P. rule 16, This
conference will be held at the office of the plaintiff's counsel unless otherwise
agreed. Plaintiff's counsel shall take the isad in organizing and presenting
discussion.
Exhibits shall be pre-marked (numerkally for plaintiff and alphabetically for
defendant. An index of all exhibits shall be prepared showing numbertietter,
offering party, brief description, and whether offered without objection, or if not, the
legal grounds for objection.

7,

4 WEEKS BEFORE TRIAL PRE-TRIAL REPORT AND PROPOSED ORDER:
The parties shall file a report of their pre-trial conference, including any stipulations
of the parties, arid a proposed order, substantially covering those matters
contemplated by I.R.C.P. rule 16(e)(G)(A) through (K). The report shali include the
index of pre-mark~dexhibits. Plaintiff's counsel shall take the lead in drafting the
report and proposed order. Any party disagreeing with the content shall submlt a
separate report identil'ying the area(s) of disagreement with explanation of
differences.

.

8.

-

2 WEEKS BEFORE T~L& BRIEFS -EXHIBIT COPIES:
Pre-friai POINTS AND AUTHORITIES on all substantive, procedural or evidentiary
issues anticipated shail be filed,
Each party shall furnish the court with, a c o of~each
~ exhibit capable of being
copied, in a binder, and tabbed for reference. A tabbed insert sheet, summarizing
any exhibit not capable of being copied, shall be included,

CVEI-ORDER FOR TRIAL, PRE'I'RIAL
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Pursuant to Rule 16, i.R.C.P, a formal Pre-trial Conference shall be held on
December 13,2007 at 1.30 p.m.

"* BENCH TRIAL ""
11.

10 DAYS BEFORE BENCH TRIAL
CONCLUSIONS

-

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND

Unless Findings and Conclusions are waived by mut~lalstiRulation of the parties,

proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW will be filed by each

partv. The court will not proceed lo trial without them. Sanctions will be
imposed for delav.

Proposed findings shall be concise and shall recite ultimate rather than mere
evidentiary facts. They will serve not only as suggested flndings of fact but also a
convenient recitation of contentions of the respective parties to be before the court
as If hears and considers the evidence.
. .
Proposed conclusions of law should be similarly concise and reflect those that can
be drawn reasonably from the proposed findings of fact, and that would support the
judgment or decisions sought. Citation of authority should not be included but shall
be sublnltted separately as Points and Authorities.
EARLIER CUT-OFF DATES MAY BE STIPULATED BY THE PARTIES,
PROPOSED EXTENSIONS OF DATES SHALL BE SUBJECT TO APPROVAL
BY THE COURT.
DELAY OF TRIAL CAUSED BY THE FAILURE OF A PARTY TO COMPLY
WITH THIS PREwTRIAL SCHEDULE WILI. RESULT IN SANCTIONS,
INCLUDING, AMONG OTHER THINGS, CONTINUANCE, DISMISSAL,
STRIKING, EXCLUSION OF WITNESS AND EWIDENCF, AND FINANCIAL
PENALTIES.

CVEI-ORDER FOR TRIAL. PRETRIAL
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-

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,
and Scott Beckstead, Individually,
vs .

Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2006-390
ORDER TO CONTINUE TRIAL

)
)

CITY OF PRESTON,

)

A Hearing having been held on the 28th day of June, 20.07 on
Defendant's Motion to Continue Trial, and Plaintiff and
Defendant's counsel having agreed to said continuance, and
further that said counsel have submitted a Stipulation to the
court to continue trial setting forth the reasons for a
continuance, and good cause appearing therefore:
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that trial in the above
entitled matter is hereby reset for January 8, and 9, 2008,
commencing at the hour of 9 : 3 0 A.M. at the Franklin County
courthouse, Preston, Idaho.

'

Dated this x r d a y of ,

2

0

0

7

.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was served by first class mail, postage
3day of
csimile, or hand delivered on this 1

Steven R. Fuller
Attorney at Law
24 North State
PO Box 191
Preston, ID 83263
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683

[
[
[

1 U.S. Mail
Facsimile
I Hand Delivered

Clyde G. Nelson
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 797
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Facsimile (208) 547-2135

[

I U.S. Mail

[)il Facsimile
[ I Hand Delivered

CLYDE G. NELSON
Attorney at Law
172 South Main Street
P.O. Box 797
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Telephone: (208) 547-2135
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136
Idaho State Bar No. 1197
Attorney ibr Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE,
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,
and Scott Beckstead, Iildividually
Plaintiff,

1
1
1
1
)

VS.

)

j

CITY OF PRESTON,
Defendant.

CASE NO. CV-2006-390
REPLY MEMORANDUM TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

COMES NOW, the Defendant, City of Preston, Idaho, and submits the following Reply
Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motioll for Summary Judgment.
1.

Attached hereto and made a part of this Reply Memoranduin are the Second

Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn, former City Engineer of Preston, Idaho, and the Supplenlentary
Affidavit of Clyde G. Nelson, Attorney for Defendant.
2.

Plaintiff asserts in Paragraph 2 of his Affidavit that he was initially told by Darrell

Wilburn that the fire-flow was adequate for the proposed subdivision. Ordinance No. 39 1, attached
to the Affidavit of Jerry Larsen, requires a 6-inch line to serve all subdivisions. (See First and
Second Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn). It was discovered by Mr. Wilburn that the 6-inch line was
connected to a 4-inch line which would restrct the flow. Scott Martin, Franklin County Fire District
Fire Marshall was of the opinion that the restriction would limit fire-flow within the subdivision and
therefore required a 6-inch line to be constructed either on Oneida Street or 800 East Street.(Second
Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn) This decision was controlling upon the City, and therefore, the
REPLY MEMORANDUM TO
PLANTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff was required to install a 6-inch line (oversized to a 12-inch line by the City). The 6-inch
line was not installed because the City wished to irnprove the water system, as suggested by Plaintiff.

3.

The Plaintiff asserts in Paragraph 5 of 15s Affidavit that it was the City's choice to

install a pipeline on 800 East. That is also incorrect. Plaintiffwas given the option of installillg the
line on Oneida Street, which would have involved construction of only 1,000 feet of line, or he could
install the line on 800 East which required approximately 1,600 to 1,700 feet. The Plaintiff chose
the latter option because there were existing utilities on Oneida Street to illclude telephone, gas,
water, and sewer service lines. (First and Second Affidavits of Darrell Wilbur~l).

4.

The Plaintiff asserts in Paragraph 13 of his Affidavit that prior to developing

Creamery Hollow Subdivision, that Darrell Wilburn, City Engineer, "confirmed to ine that pursuant
to City Ordinance, I should be reimbursed the cost of materials and labor used to constl.uct and install
the water pipeline." That too is incorrect. As Darrell Wilburn states in his Second Affidavit, Mr.
Beckstead did not discuss reimbursement of costs, materials, and labor prior to co~lstructionof the
subdivision. His only contact with Mr. Beckstead in that regard was when Mr. Beckstead discussed
reimbursement with him in October, 2004. This was after construction of the line, and Darrell
Wilburn merely advised Mr. Beckstead to discuss the same with the City Clerk. (See First and
Second Affidavits of Darrell Wilburn). Mr. Wilbur11 fullher states in his Second Affidavit that
Beckstead did not advise him of any labor, materials, or costs incurred by him in the cost of
construction at that time. As set forth in Paragraph 9 of Jerry Larsen's Affidavit, Mr. Becltstead
never did discuss with the City at any City Council meeting, or witl~himpersonally, reinlbursement
for intervening colmections to the waterline by third party property owners.
5.

Plaintiff asserts in his Memorandunl (Paragraphs 7-9) that the wording of the

Ordinance in question (Section 16.28.030B, apart oEOrdiilanceNo.39 1) that the subdivider pay the
costs of the facilities to the City is "discretionary"and not "mandatory". Assulniug that this language
is discretionary, the Plaintiffthen asserts that the obligation of the City to enter a deferred credit on
the books for the subdivider and to charge benefitted intervening property owners is mandatory.
Plaintiff is misreading the language of the Section in question. While it is discretionary with the
subdivider to pay the costs to the City and to request the City to solicit competitive bids, it is
REPLY MEMORANDUM TO
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necessary for the subdivider to request that coinpetitive bids be solicited and that he pay the
anticipated costs to the City prior to activating the provisions of the ordinance. The Subdivider may,
or may not, request the city to conduct competitive bidding, and thereafter pay or not pay the cost
to the City. I-fowever, if the subdivider does not, the provisions of the ordinance are not activated,
and the City is under no duty to collect any suns from intervening property owners for subsequent
connections. The subdivider has a choice. If he elects to activate the ordinance by requesting
conlpetitive bids, and paying the cost of improvements to the City, lle risks the possibility that the
competitive bids may be higher than the amount required for him to install the line. He would then
be required to pay that sum to the City, and the City would construct the line. In the alternative, he
can choose not to request competitive bids or to pay that sum to the City, and install the line himself,
most likely at a cheaper cost. The onlv discretionary part, ofthis ordinance is whetl~erthe subdivider
elects to activate the ordinance prior to the construction of the line. Ifhe fails to do so, the ordinance
does not apply. and the City has no duty to the Subdivider.

6.

Plaintiff argues that the ordinance does not require an agreement. Plaintiff asks,

"What would the agreement say that the City would conlply with its own ordinance?" (Paragraph 9,
Plaintiffs Memorandum). He then argues that tile City has a responsibilitytoward its citizens. The
subdivider also has an obligation to act responsibly. Througl~outhis Affidavit, ( ~ a r a ~ r a p2l ~
and
s

13), and in the Menlorandun, the Plaintiff asserts that he was well aware of the ordina~lceprior to
development of the subdivision, construction of tlie waterline, or even the purchase of his property
for the subdivision. But then, would not the subdivider have been required to act responsibly by
notifying the city that he wanted competitive bids and that he would pay the sum required for
construction of the line to the City. Instead, he seeks to sandbag the City and altllough having
knowledge ofthe ordinance,waits one year after construction ofthe line before broaching the subiect
to the Citv by his letter of October 22,2004, and after the intervening property users had already paid
the City the reauired fees for comlections. (Paid Septenlber and October 19, 2004) (See First
Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn, Affidavits of Jolui Balls and Jerry Larsen). At the time that the
intervening property owners paid their fee, they paid the sum charged by the Citv for its costs of
connecting the intervening lines to the water-main: The city made no money on the connections.
The connection fee is consumed through labor, materials, and equipment provided by the City for
the connections. If the Plaintiff had raised the matter to the City Council prior to his construction
REPLY MEMORANDUM TO

of the line, an agreement could have been entered into, specific amounts deternlined, and a fee,
above that cost charged by the City for its normal connections, could have been established for
intervening connections.
The Plaintiff questions what good an agreement would do. First, the "Agreeme~lt"is
specifically referred to, and is a requirement of the Ordinance. The agreement would establish an
effective date for the five years to colnnlence running, the amount to be reimbursed, and the division
of costs to benefitted properties. It would have determined who are intervening property owners.
How else would the City lulow the cominencement date, the amount to be collected, the property
owners benefitted, and how much to pay Beckstead each time an intervening property .owner
connected? Mr. Beckstead asserts that he received no benefit from the line. As set forth above, fhe
Fire Marshall reouired the installation of the 6-inch line along the entire distance that Mr. Beclcstead
installed the same. The Fire Marshall determined that this would tlserefore provide an adequate fireflow to the interior of Beclcstead's subdivision. TIILE. the Plaintiff benefitted froin the line. Without
the line, he would not have been allowed to construct the subdivision. As it turns out, Beckstead
benefitted the nlost from the construction of the line. He has 22 lots within his Subdivision, and only
5 additional intervening property owners have connected to the line. Thus, Beckstead has benefitted

22127th~of the cost of the improvements.
As Beckstead has benefitted the most from these in~provements,is he to be fully
reimbursed by the five intervening property owners? The result would be for Beckstead to obtain
the improvements for his subdivisio~lfree of charge, and the third party intervening users, or the
City, would pay for those improveme~lts.This is hardly equitable to the intervening property owners
or to the City. Beckstead asserts that he has to bear the entire cost of the pipeline installed for the
benefit of others. That is not true. Beckstead benefitted the most by these i~nprovenlentsand again,
would not have been permitted to construct the subdivision without the improvements.
7.

$6-911, I.C., requires every claim against a govermnental entity to be prosecuted

within two years after the date the claim arose. Said Section reads as follows:
6-911 LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. Every clainl against a
govermnental entity permitted under the provisions of this act or
against an e~nployeeof a gover~mentalentity shall be forever barred,
unless an action is begun within two (2) years after the date the clainl
arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later.
REPLY MEMORANDUM TO
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As stated by the Plaintiff in his Affidavit, and in his Memorandum in Support of his Motion
for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff was fully aware of §16.28.030B,Preston Municipal Code, on
which his case is based, prior to his purchasing his property for the subdivision, and defiantly prior
to the construction of the waterline. His claim against the City arose when he finished construction.
Beckstead claims that he was aware that the City owed him money as a result of this construction,
which only depended upon the connection of the intervening property owners. Thus, as he was
aware that he allegedly had a claim against the City at that time, he had a duty to assert it, and fulther
a duty to file his case against the City within two years after completion of the line. The line was
completed in October 2003. Thus, the Plaintiffwould have been required to file his cause of action
against the City by October, 2005. The first Complaint filed by the Plaintiff was on September 8,
2006 nearly three years after the consiruction of the waterline. The Complaint was never served on
the City, and the First Amended Complaint was served on the City on Decetnber 8, 2006. The
Plaintiff has failed to file his action within the required time period, and his cause of action should
be dismissed, and judgment entered in favor of the City.

8.

Beclcstead asserts that his letter of October, 2004, constituted a claim made under

the Idaho Tort Claims Act, and Section 50-219, Idaho Code. He states that his letter of October 22,
2004 was adequate to place the City on notice, and that the City would not have been misled as a
result if it had considered this request as a claim submitted under the Tort Claims Act. He cites the
case of Smith v. the City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618 as authority for his position. &&& can be
distinguished in that the insurance carrier for Snlith had by letter advised the City that Smith had
been in an automobile accident, the conditions under which the City was allegedly liable, and stated
that a claim was filed against the City, and that when total damages were determined, they would
also be submitted to the City. Plaintiffs letter of October 22,2004 is not a clailn against the City,
but merely arequest to meet with the City to discuss aprocess of reimbursement. The Plaintifflnade
no claim against the City, did not assert that the City was liable, and did not make demand upon the
City to pay the Plaintiff any sum. It did not even state the City was liable. The inadequacy of the
letter of October 22,2004, to constitute a claim under the Idaho Tort Clailns Act or Section 50-219,
I.C. has been fully discussed in Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Sulnmary
Judgment. Suffice it to say that the sane does not constitute a claim or demand pursuant to siction
6-902(7), does not contain the required informatidn as required by 56-907, made no ciaill1 against
I<E!'I.Y .\II:IORI\SDUh1 r0
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the City itself, and if it was a claim against the City, it was not timely filed. Tile Plaintiff was fully
aware that he had completed col1struction in October, 2003, was fully aware at the time of the
ordinance which he alleges allows hill1 to be reimbursed, and was aware of the amount that he had
expended at the time. Yet he waited one year after construction to send the letter of October 22,
2004, to the City. The day a construction project is completed triggers the notice requirement.(See
Paragraph 13 of Defendant's Memorandunl) Furthermore, cases decided by the Idaho Supreine
Court since

have "tightened"the notice requirements. At the very least, it requires a claim or

demand against the govenunental entity to pay the claimant a deter~ninedswn, or a sum yet to be
determined, and a description of the acts or conduct which give rise to the clai~n. Plaintiff's letter
merely requests a meeting the Council. That request for meeting was denied. As that time, as set
forth in the Maglluson case quoted in Defendant's initial memorandum, the Plaintiff was under a
duty to file a claim with the City. The Plaintiff failed to file that claim until July 3 1, 2006, far
beyond the 180 day time period required.
Not only did the letter of October 22,2004 fail to coilstitute a claim or demand upon the City,
merely requesting a meeting wit11 the City to discuss reimbursement, it was wltirnelv submitted and
did mislead the City to its illjury. Again, only five interveniizg connections have been made to the
line. The fees for connection (from wliich Beckstead seeks reimbursement) were paid to the City
prior to Beckstead's letter of October 22,2004. The fees paid were to reimburse the City for its
costs. Again, Beckstead's failure to timely notify the City prior to these coilnectio~lsbeing made
prevented the City from establishing additional fees for intervening coln~ectionsby which to
reimburse Beckstead. Tf the City were required to pay said fees to Beckstead, the City would be
injured in that it would be deprived of funds for reimbursement to it for its cost of illstallatio~lof the
service connections. Not only would the City suffer damages as a result of Beckstead's untimely
notice, Beckstead would receive funds for the reilnbursement of the entire line at the expense of
either the City, or five intervening property owners. The questioll the11arises why five interveni~lg
property owners should pay the full cost of a line which benefitted Beckstead's 22 lots. There is no
windfall to the City, but there would be to Beckstead ifthe court were to grant Summary Judgnlent
in his favor.

9.

Beckstead asserts in his Affidavit,'and reiterates in the Memorandun of

Plaintiff in support of his Motion for Sulnmary Judgement, that Beckstead first learned that
additional water connections had been made to the waterline after receiving the Response by the City
REPLY MEMORANDUM TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

to his Discovery Request. That is incorrect. Beckstead was fully aware that illore than one
connection had beeninade to tlne waterline in October, 2004. His letter states that he was "awarethat
several water connections have been made to that line". No further water com~ectionshave been
made to the waterline since Beckstead's letter of October 22, 2004. The July 3 1, 2006, Notice of
Claim, attempted to assert that additional water connections had been made, when none had. The
Plaintiff recognized that the initial letter by him was inadequate as a Notice of Claim, and was
attempting to remedy the sane. Obviously, tlne Plaintiff did not learn of the additional connectio~~s
through Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Discovery as the Response by tlne City was made on
February 28, 2007, long after the Notice of Claim filed by Plaintiff on July 31, 2006, alleging
additional connections. (See Supplennentary Affidavit of Clyde G. Nelson).

10.

If the court were to find in favor of the Plaintiff, attorney fees and costs, slnould not

be awarded, as tlne City has acted with a reasonable basis in fact and in law in denying any request
by the Plaintiff. The defenses ofthe City are not frivolous, or lightly taken. The cases are numerous
wherein a claimant was denied attorney fees and costs fiom a gover~unentalentity where the
governmental entity acted wit11 a reasonable basis supported by fact or law. See Haw v. Idaho State
Bd. Medicine, 2006 Idaho 31862, 137 P.3d 438(2006); Becltstead Farms. Inc. v. Bd. Of Cominirs,
141 Idaho 855(2005). However, the City is entitled to its attoriney fees and costs incurred in having
to defend an action which was brought by the Plaintiffwithout a reasonable basis in fact or law. TIne
Plaintiff failed to file any claim or notice with tlne City for one year after tlne cause of action arose.
The statutes are explicit which require a claim of some type to be filed with the goverm~nentalentity
within 180 days after the claim arose. As the claim arose on the date that the Plaintiff i-inislled
construction (October, 2003) it was incumbent that the Plaintiff file his claim by the end of April,
2004. I-Ie failed to do so. He has brought an action against ihe.City without legal basis, afker llaving
failed to comply wit11 the notice requirements, and after the two year statute of limitations had
expired. He has subjected the City and its taxpayers to needless and unwarra~tedexpense to defend
this action. The City should recover its attorney fees and costs.

DATED thiJLday
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of July, 2007.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that a true and correct copy of Defei~dant'sReply Memorandul~to
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was served, first class postage, on the 23'* day of July,

2007.
Steven R. Fuller
Attorney at Law
24 North State
PO Box 191
Preston, ID 83263
Facsimile (208) 852-2683
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[x] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered

M Facsimile

CLYDE G. NELSON
Attorney at Law
172 South Main Street
P.O. Box 797
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Telephone: (208) 547-2135
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136
Idaho State Bar No. 1197
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE,
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,
and Scott Beckstead, Individually
VS

Plaintiff,

.

)
)
)
)
)

CITY OF PRESTON,
Defendant.

CASE NO. CV-2006-390

1

)
)
)
)
)

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF
DARRELL WILBURN IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

COMES NOW Darrell Wilbur~~,
up011 oath duly deposes and says:

1.

I have reviewed the Affidavit of Scott Beckstead dated June 21,2007 filed in
Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.

2.

As represented in Paragraph 2 of Mr. Beckstead's Affidavit, I did llleet with him
prior to his developlnent of the proposed subdivision. It is true that I advised him
that he would need to co~lllectto a 6-inch waterline. The same is required by the
Subdivision Ordinance of the City. At the time the fire flow test was conducted, I
was unaware that the 6-inch line to which Mr. Beckstead would have connected
was in turn coimected to a 4-inch line. The restriction in the 4-inch line would
have created inadequate fire flow to the interior of Mr. Beckstead's subdivision.

3.

Scott Marshall, who is Fire Marshall for Franklin County Fire District, and was at
the time in question, advised me that even if Mr. Beckstead could obtain a fire
flow at the beginning of the subdivision, that he was of the opitlioll tliat it would
be an inadequate fire Row for the interior of the subdivision and that he would not
approve the connection unless the line were 6-inch for the entire dista~lce.For
that reason, Mr. Beclcstead was required to put in a 6-inch waterline.

4.

Mr. Beckstead could have put the 6-inch line along Oneida Street. This would
have only involved replacing 1,000 feet of existing 4-inch line with a 6-inch water
main. He had that option or to put the waterline on 800 East Street, and he chose
the second option. He was not required to install the line on 800 East.

5.

If Mr. Beckstead had installed the line on Oneida Street, he may have reduced his
expenditure as this would involve 700 feet less of pipeline. It is my recollection
that Mr. Beckstead chose the 800 East route because Oneida Street had existing
utilities on it to include telephone, gas, and water and sewer service lines.

6'.

I have also read Paragraph 13 of Mr. Beckstead's Affidavit. Contrary to Mr.
Beckstead's assertions, prior to construction of the line, I did not discuss with him
reimbursement of costs, materials, and labor for the waterline. My only contact
with Mr. Beckstead in that regard is as stated in Paragraph 10 of my prior
Affidavit. Mr. Beckstead discussed possible reimbursement with me after he had
constructed the line. I did not advise him that he should be reimbursed pursuant
to Section 16.28.030B, Preston Municipal Code, told him that he should discuss
any reimbursement with the City Clerk, and Mr. Beckstead did not advise me of
any labor or materials or costs incurred by him in the cost of construction at that
time.

7'.

Contrary to Mr. Beckstead's assertion that he discovered that only one connection
had been made to the SO0 East waterline in October, 2004, Mr. Beckstead advised
me during our conversation in October, 2004, that he was aware of several water
connections having been made to the Iine on 800 East as a result of development
of the Jensen Subdivision. Four of the connections were made to the waterline in
October, 2004, and one connection was made in November, 2004. No
connections have been made since that time. To make a connection to the
waterline, the same is obvious, as it is necessary for the City to excavate, place the
connection on the city water main, and extend a pipe from the city water main to
the property Iine of the intervening property. A water meter assembly is aiso
attached which is usually apparent from the street.

IATED t h i e d a y of July, 2007.
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Darrell Wilburn

I

I

~

I

&,2007

hbscribed and sworn to before me this & day of
~,\\\\\lll~~l~llll/////

+*.............'...?!&
*
&%..
s '+oTAr9&:..>o3
&' -L.
i WlL(?,

-==I"-- ....:.
+

.. 5-e. =

-g-

Z '..,AueLl~
;
;
: $
$=!!...- ............... . 0 $
%4T6

//////I,/ I,,,),

*

, ,,,,

,(\\\\\

24

CLYDE G. NELSON
Attorney at Law
172 South Main Street
P.O. Box 797
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Telephone: (208) 547-2135
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136
Idaho State Bar No. 1197
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE,
COMPANY, an Idaho Corooration.
and scott Beckstead, individually

)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2006-390

Plaintiff,
SUPPLEMENTARY AFFIDAVIT OF
CLYDE G. NELSON IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO
) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT
)
)
)

CITY OF PRESTON,
Defendant.

...................................

)
)
)

COMES NOW Clyde G. Nelson, upon oath duly deposes and says:

1.

In Paragraph 15 of the Affidavit of Scott Beckstead in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Beckstead alleges that he "learned waterline
connections had been made along 800 East as set forth in Exhibit " Hattached
hereto" after receiving responses by the City to his discovery requests. In
Paragraph 16 of his Affidavit, he asserts that on July 3 1,2006, a second Notice of
Claim was presented to the City citing additional water connections that had been
made to the water pipeliile along 800 East.

2.

Mr. Beckstead's assertioils are incorrect. He asserted in his letter of October 22,
2004, to the City that he was aware of several connectio~lshavine been made to
the waterline. The assertions that he became aware o f additional waterline
connections as a result of Responses to Discovery are also incorrect. Defendant's
Responses to Discovery were first filed on February 28,2007. Mr. Beckstead
could not have first learned about these com~ectionsthrougl~the Responses to
Discovery as he asserted the sane in his claim of July 3 1, 2006 or in his letter of
October 22,2004.

son, Preston City A t t y y

Subscribed and sworn to before me t h i s2 3 day o

.

Notary Public fbrbdaho
~ e s i d i at
n ~~ r a c ;
Co~mn.Expires 1

d .18 ' $0 1

STEVEN R. FULLER - 2995
Steven R. Fuller Law Office
24 North State
P.O. Box 191
Preston, ID 83263
Telephone: (208) 852-2680
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SlXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE
COMPANY, an ldaho Corporation, and
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, individually,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

CASE NO. CV-06-390

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal
Corporation,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs, Scott Beckstead Real Estate Company, an ldaho
Corporation, and Scott Beckstead, individually, (hereafter collectively referred to as
"Beckstead") and in response to the Defendant's, City of Preston, (hereafter "City") Motion
for Summary Judgment, hereby submits the following memorandum:

SUPPLEMENTAL FACTS

1.

Beckstead incorporates herein by reference the Affidavit of Scott Beckstead

in Support of Beckstead's Motion for Summary Judgement and the Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment already on file with the Court.
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2.

In order to avoid a delay in obtaining approval for the Creamery Hollow

Estates Subdivision, Beckstead did not refuse or object to installing the pipeline along 81h
East, since he was aware there was a possibility of reimbursement pursuant to a Preston
City Ordinance relating to subdivisions. He went forward with the installation of the pipeline
even though his subdivision water connection would be made to an existing six-inch water
line with sufficient fire flow, which met the existing requirements of the City. It was not until
later the City determined the six-inch water pipeline was, at some point along Oneida
Street, reduced to a four-inch water line and would have to be replaced or Beckstead was
given a choice to install a new pipeline along 8Ih East: (See Ex. A to Second Affidavit of
Beckstead, a Memo authored by City Engineer Darrel Wilburn).

3.

No engineering costs were incurred on this project and none were required

by the City of Preston. The City had its own engineer to review the project as it so desired
and no separate design or engineering oversight was required by the City. (See Second
Affidavit of Scott Beckstead).

4.

The City was fully aware Beckstead was purchasing the pipe for the project

since reimbursement to Beckstead for "oversizing" the pipe to twelve inches had already
been discussed and invoices provided by Beckstead to City representatives and the cost
of the pipe was not objected to by the City as being excessive or extraordinary. (See
Second Affidavit of Scott Beckstead).

5.

The entrance to Beckstead's subdivision is located on 6Ih East in Preston.

The pipeline he installed is on 81h East. The pipeline is completely "off-site" from his
subdivision.

Memorandum in Response to
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6.

The City did not require competitive bidding on the project nor that the costs

of the project be paid to the City directly, but instead Beckstead was allowed to purchase
the pipe directly from vendors and to be responsible to install the pipe himself. (See
Second Affidavit of Scott Beckstead).

ARGUMENT

11.

THE CITY'S INTERPRETATION OF ORDINANCE 16.28.030 B IS AN
ATTEMPT TO OBFUSCATE THE PLAIN INTENT OF THE ORDINANCE.

The intent of the Preston City Ordinance Section 16.28.030 B (hereafter "City
Ordinance") is to provide for reimbursement of costs incurred for "off-site" improvements
made by a subdivider when required by the City so that one person is not required to bear
all the costs of installing an improvement which shall benefit intervening property owners
who connect to sewer and water lines put in place solely at the cost of the subdivider. The
City Ordinance was an attempt to share the burden of such costs, allowing them to be
more fairly apportioned among those who connect to the water or sewer line after the total
cost of the initial construction has been borne solely by one individual or entity.
The City's initial argument (Def. Brief p.5) focuses on the first sentence of the
ordinance which states:
Whenever any intervening property ("off-site") is benefitted by the
installation of any of the required facilities, the subdivider
pay the
cost of such facilities to the Citv, such costs to be determined by
competitive bids solicited by the city togetherwith verified engineering
costs required therefore. (emphasis added)

The City sidesteps the obvious intent of the City Ordinance and ignores the use of the word
"may" in the first sentence of the ordinance by making the requirements for competitive
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bidding and engineering costs mandatory rather than discretionary as denoted by the use
of the word "may". Further, the City did not require competitive bidding or engineering nor
that the costs of the facilities had to be paid to the City. It is incumbent upon the City to
make such requirements known to the subdivider, if the City wishes to make such
requirements mandatory. No form, no letter, nothing was given to Beckstead which would
have let him know the City was making mandatorycompetitive bidding and payment to the
City of the costs of such facilities. The City knew full well Beckstead was paying for the
project and would obtain his own pricing for materials as evidenced by the City's
reimbursement to Beckstead for the costs of oversizing the pipe to 12 inches in diameter.
The City did not object to the prices he obtained. The City did not require engineering
drawings or detailed schematics since installation of the pipe was relatively simple and the
City had its own engineer to oversee any aspects of the project it so desired.
The City also states that the parties had to enter into an "agreement" before the
subdivider could be reimbursed and that such agreement had to have been in writing. 'The
City's argument seems to be that some type of written agreement must be entered into
before the City is required to obey the terms of its own Ordinance. Nowhere in the City
Ordinance does it say there must exist an agreement in writing and obviously an oral
agreement was reached with regards to putting in the pipeline as evidenced by the
memoranda and letters between the City and Beckstead detailing what he would be
required to do.
The City argues if an agreement had been put in place, then the City could have
charged more to persons connecting to the water system or made other arrangements had
they but known they would have to follow the terms of their own Ordinance. Certainly, the
Memorandum in Response to
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City is charged with the knowledge of its own Ordinances and what it could have.charged
or should have done is mere speculation. The City points to no ordinance which would
have ailowed it to charge more for a water connection along 800 East than it would charge
to another person connecting to the water system in another part of the City.
The remaining arguments propounded by the City on pages 6 and 7 of its brief are
both confusing and illogical. Reference is made to the lots in Beckstead's subdivision and
some type of mathematical calculation created by the City's engineer stating that 50
properties could have benefitted from the installation of the pipeline, then Beckstead would
have been responsible for 22150th~of said costs. Whatever water connection fees or
costs were incurred or paid for the lots within Beckstead's Creamery Hollow Estates
Subdivision are irrelevant to this case since the ordinance mandates reimbursement for
"off-site" improvements which are required by the City to which others may later take
advantage by connecting to the pipelines installed by the subdivider. The City's argument
has no merit since it is not applicable to the straight forward language of the City
Ordinance. Certainly, Beckstead was not reimbursed any monies for the connections
made within his subdivision. The City Ordinance does not provide for some type of
apportionment as is suggested by the City based upon who benefits from the water
connections. It states in simple and easy to understand terms:
The City shall thereafter enter a deferred credit in its books and records
and shall charge the benefitted intervening property owners the fee
rates for sewer and water connections in effect at the time such
connections are made. Such fees shall then be returned to the
subdivider to reimburse the costs of the installation of the facilities; ...
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The mathematical formula proposed by the City based upon the number of possible water
connections to the pipeline makes no sense in light of the clear language of the City
Ordinance.

Ill.

THE DEMAND FOR REIMBURSEMENT BY BECKSTEAD IS A
STATUTORY CLAIM NOT A CLAIM BASED IN CONTRACT AND
THEREFORE THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NOT APPLICABLE.
The City claims no written agreement was entered into between the parties and

therefore enforcement of the ordinance would be contrary to the Statute of Frauds.
Beckstead is not suing the City for breach of contract but is asking the City to obey its own
ordinance which mandates reimbursement to him. This is clearly the intent of the
ordinance and no contract is required to force the parties to obey the law.
The City claims since there was no contract in writing between the parties, the
enforcement of such an "agreement" could not extend beyond one year. The ordinance
itself clearly grants a five-year period for reimbursement to the subdivider for off-site
improvements made as a requirement by the City when intervening property owners
connect to a water or sewer connection installed by the Subdivider. No violation of the
statute of frauds occurs when the language of the ordinance itself provides for five years
in which to obtain reimbursement.

IV.

BECKSTEAD PROVIDED THE CITY WITH AN ADEQUATE NOTICE 0 6
CLAIM ON OCTOBER 22,2004.
The City claims Beckstead's letter of October 22, 2004 does not meet the

requirements of Idaho Code 36-907. The purpose and intent of the Notice of Claim statute
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is to provide a public entity with sufficient notice of a claim so that it would not be misled
to its prejudice. This principle is stated in the last sentence of the statute:

A claim filed under the provisions of this section shall not be held
invalid or insufficient by reason of an inaccuracy in stating the time,
place, nature or cause of the claim, or otherwise, unless it is shown
that the governmental entity was in fact misled to its injury thereby.
Following the letter by Beckstead on October 22, 2004, in which he requests
reimbursement for his off-site improvements pursuant to the City Ordinance (Beckstead

Aff., Ex. F), the City replied, through counsel, with a two-page letter dated November 16,
2004, stating in detail why it denied Beckstead's claim. (Beckstead Aff. Ex. G) The City's
letter of denial did not state the City did not understand or was confused about what
Beckstead was claiming. It is obvious from the City's letter, it knew exactly what Beckstead
was referring to and the City was certainly was not misled to its prejudice by some
inaccuracy or insufficiency in the letter. The City even knew how much the materials had
cost Beckstead since they had exchanged that information as part of the City's
reimbursement to Beckstead for the oversizing of the pipe.
The City's position on when the 180 day period for filing a Notice of Claim began is
untenable. In its brief on page 10, the City states:
Beckstead was aware of the costs of his improvements and laborwhen
he completed his construction in October, 2003. His cause of action,
if any, arose at that time.
In essence, the City asserts Beckstead should have filed a Notice of Claim before
any other connections had been made to the pipeline he installed and before any fees had
been paid by intervening property owners as contemplated by the City Ordinance. What
would have been the purpose of such a claim since nothing was owed to Beckstead at that
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time. Beckstead's claim is not for the failure of the City to pay him for the project upon its
completion, but the failure of the City to reimburse him over a five-year period pursuant to
the City ordinance. He was not hired as a contractor by the City to install the pipeline and
he did not expect to be paid upon completion of the project.
The City's argument is even more misplaced given the fact the City Ordinance
allows the subdivider a period of five years to obtain reimbursement for the construction
of his off-site improvements. If anything, the letter by Beckstead and subsequenttort claim
notice filed on his behalf could be considered premature, since Beckstead should have the
entire five years in which to collect reimbursement and time for providing a Notice would
begin running at the end of the five-year period
In Farberv. State ofldaho, 102 ldaho 398,401-402,630 P.2d 685,688-689 (1981)
the Supreme Court reviewed a case in which owners of the building brought an action
against the State and others for negligent planning, construction and design of a street
reconstruction project and seeking damages for condemnation of a portion of their
property. The District Court granted the State's motion to dismiss for failure to timely file
a notice of claim under the ITCA, but the Supreme Court reversed the decision and
remanded the case back to the District Court. At issue was whether or not the Plaintiffs
had to file their notice of claim before the project was completed orwhether they could wait
until the project was done before triggering the notice of claim statute. The ldaho Court
stated:
Unless the contract and all the acts performed pursuant to the contract
have been completed, it would be difficult for the State to determine the
nature or extent of its liability or prepare defense to any claim.
Furthermore, if parties can present the State with a complete and
definite claim for damages arising from the continuing tort, then the
Memorandum in Response to
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State may attempt a settlement on the basis of clearly ascertainable
facts. If we were to adopt a contrary view, settlements would either be
based on pre-completion, speculative damages, orwould have to await
the completion of the project. A strict or literal interpretation of the
notice requirements of the ITCA would result in denying the legitimate
claims of those who have suffered injury at the hands of the State,
without furthering in the least the legislative purposes behind the
statute.
Footnote 3. We do not suggest that it would be improper to file an ITCA
notice of claim prior to completion of the project. We simply address
the question of the last possible day upon which a notice meeting the
requirements of the act must be filed.
If the word "ordinance" is substituted for the word "contract" in the above quotation,
it becomes clear Beckstead would have five years from the day he completed the project
to file his notice of claim. To file a claim when he completed the project would have been
useless and speculative, at best, since it was impossible to know how many water
connections, if any, would be made to the pipeline. If no connections were made to the
pipeline installed by Beckstead during thefive-year period prescribed in the City Ordinance,
he would have no claim against the City for any reimbursement. Certainly, he should be
allowed to file a claim before the completion of the five-year period, as he learned of
connections made to the pipeline. In fact, each connection could trigger a new notice of
claim and a lawsuit to collect each, however, filing suit in multiple causes of action for
essentially the same purpose is contrary to any notion ofjudicial economy and the general
policy against multiplicity of lawsuits. One of the purposes of requesting a Writ of
Mandamus from the Court in this case is to require the City to continue to reimburse
Beckstead until he has been paid in full as connections are made to the pipeline he
installed rather than making him guess as to when such connections are made and fees
paid to the City.
Memorandum in Response to
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Beckstead was not hired by the City to do the pipeline installation. If this were so,
he would have had an immediate claim upon the completion of the pipeline installation for
payment by the City and the notice requirement would have started to run. When
Beckstead completed the pipeline installation in October of 2003, he had no basis for a
claim against the City since any claim he may have had would arise over the next five
years pursuant to the City Ordinance. The City's argument that Beckstead had to file a
notice of claim when he completed the pipeline installation, defies reason and would have
resulted in a claim for purely speculative damages. The only way to know the actual
amount the City should be required to reimburse Beckstead would be to wait until the entire
five-year period has elapsed. In the meantime, the City should reimburse Beckstead for
those water connection fees that have been paid up to this point in time.
The case upon which the City heavily relies in its brief is Magnuson Properties v.
Coeur D'Alene, 138 Idaho 166, 59 P.2d 971 (2002). In fact the City asserts this case to
be directly on point and we think it to be on point, as well. In Magnuson, the City required
Magnuson to extend a sewer line from property owned by the City to an adjoining parcel
owned by a third party. He objected because the extension increased his cost and
provided no benefit to him. Magnuson claimed the City engineer agreed he would be
reimbursed for the additional cost associated with the extension. (Obviously, there was no
City Ordinance mandating reimbursement for such costs as there is in the case at bar).
Magnuson sent a letter on May 10, 1996 asking for reimbursement for his additional costs
in installing the sewer line. On August 13, 1996, the City sent a letter to Magnuson
denying the existence of any agreement between the City and Magnuson and rejecting his
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request for reimbursement. Magnuson then filed a Notice of Tort Claim on February 18,
1997, beyond the 180-day notice period,
What the City in our case fails to acknowledge is the very language in Magnuson
which is directly on point with Beckstead's position. Beckstead's letter of October22,2004
was a claim for reimbursement and is being submitted to the Court as a notice of his claim
pursuant to statute. Magnuson's claim was denied and this was affirmed by the Supreme
Court, but the Court noted an entirely different outcome could have been reached had
Magnuson asserted his May 10, 1996 letter to be a notice of his claim under Idaho Code
$6-906 et. seq
The Court in Magnuson, supra, at 170 stated,
Arguably, Magnuson's May 10, 1996 letter asking for reimbursement
was a notice of claim for purposes of the ITCA: However, because this
argument was raised for the first time on appeal, this Court will not
consider it.

In this case, Beckstead will not make the same error. His letter of October 22,2004,
was clearly a claim for reimbursement for the installation of the costs of putting in the offsite improvements pursuant to the City Ordinance and even more importantly, the City
recognized it as such as evidenced by its letter denying his claim dated November 16,
2004. (Beckstead Aff. Exs. F and G).
The position of the Magnuson court was made even more clear in the concurring
opinion of Justice Walters. He wrote:
Here, the City denied the claim on August 13,1996, some 95 days after
May 10. The City's reason for rejecting the claim is irrelevant. At that
point, in my opinion, Magnuson was free to file an action to collect on
the rejected claim. Magnuson did not need to later send in a second
claim addressing the same dispute when that claim had already been
Memorandum in Response to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment - Page 11

denied by operation o f the terms of the pertinent statute and by the
City's rejection in fact.
However, Magnuson chose not to rely on the,May 10 letter as a notice
of claim. Instead, Magnuson continued to pursue discussions with the
City in an attempt to receive reimbursement for its project's costs.
When Magnuson's attempts proved futile, Magnuson sent another
demand notice in February, 1997,and then filed suit when that demand
was rejected. As it turned out, of course, the February 1997 Notice of
Claim was held untimely by the District Court upon the facts as
presented and argued by the parties in this case.
The Court's opinion in this case correctly notes that Magnuson did not
contend in the District Court that the May 10 letter had the effect of the
Notice of Claim under the ITCA. Indeed, even at oral argument on this
appeal when the subject was broached, Magnuson took the position
that the May 10 letter did not serve as a notice to the City of
Magnuson's claim.
Because Magnuson decided to proceed under its own interpretation of
the steps to be followed without suggesting to the Court the correct
alternative route, this Court is not required to reconstruct the case and
put it on the proper track. Accordingly, I concur with the approach
expressed in the Court's opinion concerning the role the May $0letter
legally played in this case.
The poor choice by Magnuson shall not be repeated here. The Beckstead letter is
submitted to this Court as notice of his claim and it certainly was sufficient to put the City
on notice as intended by ldaho Code 56-907 and the City was not misled to its injury or
prejudiced by any lack of specificity in the letter.
As noted in Beckstead's opening brief, a very similar situation occurred in another
appellate decision ironically involving the City of Preston. In Smith v. Cify of Preston, 99
ldaho 618, 586, P.2d 1062 (1978), the City tried unsuccessfully to avoid a legitimate claim
by stating the notice sent to the City was insufficient. In that case, a letter sent by an
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insurance carrier on a subrogation claim was deemed to be sufficient notice by Smith of
his claim to the City. The Court held at 621:
Although the contents of the letter of October 8 does not comply with
all of the requirements enumerated in Section 6-907, we believe the
contents of the letter were adequate in light of the final proviso of that
shall not be held invalid or
section which states that '(a) Claim
insufficient by reason of inaccuracy in stating the time, place, nature or
cause of the claim, or otherwise, unless it is shown that the
governmental entity was in fact misled to its injury thereby'. 1.C. § 6-

...

907.

In Smith, supra, at 621, the Court indicated there was nothing in the record to
suggest the City was "misled to its injury" by any deficiencies in the contents of the letter.
"On the contrary, the reply by the City's insurance carrier indicates that the October 8 letter
was sufficient to notify the City that a claim against it was being pursued and to apprise the
City of sufficient facts for it to investigate the matter, determine its merits and prepare a
defense".
The City in this case would be hard pressed to state with complete honesty it did not
know what was meant by the Beckstead letter of October 22,2004, or that it was misled
to its prejudice by that letter. Obviously, the City understood the letter or else how would
it have been able to prepare a detailed reply.
The City cites a number of cases in its brief in which the Supreme Court has
affirmed decisions in which claims have been dismissed for failure to file a timely or proper
notice of claim, but each case must be looked at in light of its peculiar and separate set of
circumstances and then compared to the case at hand. None of the cases cited by the
City come closer to the current set of facts and circumstances than Magnuson, supra and
City of Preston, supra.
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In Fosfer v. Koofenai Medical Center, 143 ldaho 425, 146 P.3d 691 (2006), the
Supreme Court did reject a claim filed by Foster, but the factual circumstances are not
even close to the case at bar. The Medical Center was forwarded a copy of a letter sent
to the ldaho State Board of Medicine as part of a pre-litigation screening and no letter was
sent directly to the Medical Center by the claimant indicating he was filing a claim. The
Court held:
The act's purpose of putting the government on notice to possible
claims to which it may be subject, requires more than reliance on
coincidental actions by a neutral third party. We conclude that Foster
may not take advantage of ISBM's fortuitous decision to forward his
letter to KMC to satisfy his obligation under Section 6-906 of the Act; he
was required to formally notify KMC and his neglecting to do so
prevents adjudication of his tort claim.

The Beckstead letter was sent directly to the City requesting reimbursement for the
off-site improvements he had made. This does not fit in any may the fact pattern cited in
Foster. His letter was not forwarded by some third party to the City and the City was not
deceived in any way about who Beckstead was or what he wanted.
The City cites BHA lnvesfments, lnc. v. CjtyofBoise, 141 ldaho 168, 108 P.3d 315
(2004) in support of its argument Beckstead did not file a proper claim.

In BHA

Investments, at 174, the Supreme Court held a notice of claim filed by one entity would not
be sufficient as a notice of claim for another and upheld the district court's decision. The
relevance of this case to Beckstead's claim is unknown. The October 22, 2004 letter of
Scott Beckstead (Beckstead Affidavit Ex. F) bears the letterhead of Scott Beckstead Real
Estate Company and is signed by Scott Beckstead. No other entity was involved. The City
would be hard pressed to assert it did not know with whom it was dealing when it received
the letter from Beckstead requesting reimbursement for the offsite improvements
Memorandum in Response to
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In the next case cited by the City in its brief, Mitchell v. Binghani MemorialHospital,
130 ldaho420,942 P.2d 544 (1997), the court held oral statements made by the claimant's
attorney to representatives of the hospital were insufficient to constitute a valid claim under
I.C. § 6-907. Beckstead has no argument with that holding since his letter of October 22,
2004 was in writing and did give notice of his claim which is defined by Idaho Code § 6902(7) as "any written demand to recover money damages from a governmental entity or
its employee which any person is legally entitled to recover under this act as compensation
for the negligent or otherwise wrongful act or omission of a governmental entity . . ."
Following along in the City's brief, it cites McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho
719,747 P.2d 741 (1987), a case in which a property owner had obtained a building permit
which was later revoked by the City of Ammon. He filed a notice of claim with the City for
improperly issuing the permit and for revoking the permit. Since more than 120 days had
elapsed from the date the permit was issued and the date the notice was given, the Court
upheld the District Court's decision to dismiss the action. The landowner had claimed
substantial notice was given by previous court pleadings filed within the 120-day period,
however, the Supreme Court held those pleadings referenced a negligent revocation of the
permit, not an negligent issuance of a building permit and therefore his claim for negligent
issuance of the permit was barred.
Beckstead does not claim the City had only a partial notice of his claim, but had
more than substantial notice of his claim for reimbursement under the City Ordinance. If
the City was so uncertainas to Beckstead's claim following his letter of October 22, 2004,
then why did they not invite him to a City Council meeting as he requested to discuss the
claim? Instead, the City chose to respond in a detailed letter dated November 16, 2004
Memorandum in Response to
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(Beckstead Aff. Exs. F and G) which demonstrates th&.city knew what Beckstead was
seeking in its letter of denial. The City claims it did not have adequate notice of the amount
of the claim, but providing that information would have been pointless, since the City was
denying the entire claim as stated in its letter.
The City next cites Thompson v. City ofldaho Falls, 126 ldaho 587, 887 P.2d 1094
(1994) in which the Supreme Court held a claimant had not sufficiently described the
conduct and circumstances which brought about her alleged injury. If it is the City's
argument it did not have sufficient knowledge regarding the conduct and circumstances
which brought about Beckstead's claim, then a reading of the City's denial letter
(Beckstead Aff. Ex. G) dispels any such notion and refutes completely that argument. The
City knew exactly what the circumstances and basis were for Beckstead's claim and to
assert otherwise would be disingenuous.
The next cased cited by the City is Wicksfrom v. North ldaho College, IIIldaho
450, 725 P.2d 155 (1986) in which students sued their college on the basis it
misrepresented they would qualify as an entry level journeymen after successful
completion of the course. On appeal, the court noted the claimant's attorney failed to put
in his initial demand letter the names and addresses of the claimants, amount of claimed
damages, and the nature of the injury claimed. However, a tort claim was not the thrust
of the plaintiff's argument in that case as the Court stated, "It should be noted, however,
that appellant's admitted at oral argument that the letter of August 21, 1984 was never
intended to constitute notice of a tort claim. Rather, appellants contend that their cause
of action lies in contract." (Wickstrom, supra at 452)

I
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Whatever its argument may be, the City certainly knew the name and address of
Beckstead and the nature of the injury claimed pursuant to his letter. (Beckstead Aff. , Ex.
F) The exact amount of his damages was not stated in the letter but the City already had

knowledge of the amount of materials and costs he had put into the project since the City
had partially reimbursed him for the oversizing of the pipe. Also, Beckstead did not know
how many water connection fees had been made and so the exact amount of
reimbursement available could only have been known by the City.
The City states it was somehow misled to its prejudice by the Beckstead letter since
the City claims it was not aware Beckstead would seek reimbursement for his costs prior
to receipt of the letter in October 2004. Does this mean the City did not know it had the
Ordinance 16.28.030 B on its books? The City argues it could have charged more to
intervening property owners who connected into the system had they known of Becksteads
claim, however, the City points to no ordinance which would allow it to charge more for a
water connection under such circumstances. If this speculative argument is to be taken
seriously, then the City would need a special ordinance granting it the authority to charge
for one water connection differently from another solely on the basis the City had not
installed the pipeline in the first place. The City Ordinance itself states:

... The

City shall thereafter enter adeferred credit in its books and
records and shall charge the benefittedintervening property owners the
fee rates for sewer and water connections in effect at the time such
connections are made.

Clearly, the City could only charge those fees which were in existence at the time and no
special fees or rates could be imposed.

F,len.3.ana.m
n Respmse lo
0efenoa"ls lfl,itr,n f~ S~mrnar,JL3yrneri. Page ' 7

The City argues it makes little or no money from the installation of its water
connections based upon the fees it charges. (See Affidavits of John Balls, current Preston
City Director of Public Works and former City Engineer, Darrel Wilburn) The basis for this
assertion is the cost of materials, labor, use of equipment, supervision and costs of
administration, which are broken down in these Affidavits. All of these expenses, except
the cost of materials, would be incurred anyway whether the City workers were installing
a water connection or not, since their labor and equipment would be involved in doing
something else for the City as part of their regular duties. Of course, the amount of such
fee is entirely within the province of the City and the fee is set based on the City's own
standards. If the City had to install the 12-inch pipeline required of Beckstead, how much
more money would the City have lost from its water system budget. The City's argument
is really immaterial since the ordinance provides that the water connection fees paid
be reimbursed and the subdivider

be paid the costs of the installation of the facilities

over a period of five years depending on how many connections are made to the water line
installed. There is no mention made of a net reimbursement by the City or anything similar
to the argument now being made by the City. It simply cannot be found in the ordinance
and is therefore not applicable.

V.

THE CITY'S ARGUMENT IT HAS NOT BEEN UNJUSTLY ENRICHED BY THE
INSTALLATION OF THE PIPELINE BY BECKSTEAD IS CONFUSING AND
WITHOUT MERIT.

It appears the argument of the City against a claim of unjust enrichment by
Beckstead is that Beckstead made a profit from the sale of lots in his subdivision and
therefore is not entitled to reimbursement for an offsite improvement made on 8thEast in

Memorandum in Response to
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Preston (the entrance to Beckstead's subdivision is located on 6'h East in Preston). Had
he lost money on the project, would the City then feel obligated to reimburse him for the
pipeline he installed? This argument defies reason since the plain fact is Beckstead was
required to install a pipeline on 8th East (an off-site improvement) even though his
subdivision would connect io an existing 6-inch line at the entrance to his subdivision, with
adequate existing fire flow. (The City's position is that the 6-inch line at some point turned
into a 4-inch line and therefore the ordinance requiring subdivisions to connect into a 6-inch
line was not met). Despite whatever objection he may have had to such a requirement,
Beckstead nevertheless went forward to put in the 12-inch pipeline along 8thEast in order
to satisfy the City, but knowing there existed an ordinance which would allow him to be
reimbursed for his costs. The City directly benefitted from the installation of the twelve-inch
pipeline along 8lh East without having to pay for it, since it did not have to install the
pipeline itself in order to "loop" the City's water system.

(See Willburn Memo, 2nd

Beckstead Aff. Ex. "A") Such a windfall should not be allowed to happen simply because
the City does notwish to repay Beckstead since he made a profit on his subdivision. There
is no rational connection between Beckstead making a profit on his subdivision and the fact
the City obtained a windfall of 1,700 feet of pipe installed and paid for by Beckstead

Vi.

CITY ORDINANCE 16.28.030 B WAS NOT REPEALED AT THE TIME
BECKSTEAD INSTALLED THE PIPELINE.
.
The City has to admit City Ordinance Section 16.28.03C B was not repealed at the

time Beckstead constructed the pipeline. It was later repealed, but now, the City argues
the language in Ordinance 461 (which clearly states it shall not apply to subdividers)
somehow repealed the City ordinance in question herein. The language relied upon is the
Memorandum in Response to
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general language found in many ordinances which states: "All ordinances or parts of
ordinances in conflict with this ordinance are hereby repealed, ..." The attemptto bootstrap
the repeal of one ordinance, without specifically mentioning it, through the passage of
another ordinance which pertains to an entirely different set of circumstances is ineffective
to repeal Ordinance § 16.28.030 B, a subdivision ordinance unrelated to ordinance 461
and found in a different part of the City's Municipal Code.
Ordinance 461 (Exhibit "J1" to the Affidavit of Jerry Larsen) provides for
reimbursement to a person who extends a water or sewer line to property not currently
being serviced by the City. The Beckstead subdivision was certainly within the City and
he was not asked to extend a water line to an area not currently being serviced by the City.
The 6-inch water line to which he connected ran directly in front of the property he
subdivided. Therefore, the Ordinance upon which he reliesfor reimbursement has nothing
to do with Ordinance 461. The type of "general or blanket repeal" urged by the City in this
case of any ordinances in conflict therewith does not apply.

If it was repealed by

Ordinance 461, then why did the City need to later repeal Ordinance 16.28.030 B on
December 13, 2004 (Exhibit " K , Affidavit of Jerry Larsen) if it had already been repealed
by Ordinance No. 461? The answer is obvious. The City knew the Ordinance had not
been repealed and was still in effect.
There exists specific proceduresforthe repeal of an ordinance, none of which were
followed in the alleged repeal of Ordinance 16.28.030 B. Idaho Code §50-902 gives the
proper procedure:
(...) and no ordinance or section thereof shall be revised or amended
unless all ordinances, which are intended to amend existing
ordinances, shall have the words which are added to such ordinance
R1emoraro~-' 1 H?;ponse fa
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underlined; when the amendment is to strikeout or repeal any part of
an existing ordinance, the letter, figure, word or words stricken or
repealed shall be printed with a line through such letter, figure, word or
words in the printed bill to indicate the part stricken or repealed.
No such procedure was followed and the City's attempt to create a blanket repeal
of any ordinance that may generally conflict with another without even mentioning the
ordinance or its repeal is not effective for that purpose.
A later ordinance cannot be deemed to repeal an earlier ordinance unless there is
an irreconcilable conflict between the two, or the new ordinance is clearly intended as a
substitute for the prior ordinance. (56 Am Jur 2" d372 2.4 114). Our Supreme Court has
held, "An ordinance can be repealed only by pursuance of the same method necessary for
its enactment." Beem v. Davis, 31 Idaho 730, 175 P.959, 962 (1918).

SUMMARY
The first inquiry of any court into the interpretation of an ordinance or statute is to
seek out its "intent". There can be no question the intent of the City Ordinance was to
provide for reimbursement of costs incurred for "off-site" improvements made by a
subdivider so that one person would not be required to bear all the costs of installing such
an improvement. The facts of this case fit perfectly within the intent of the City Ordinance.
The City Ordinance itself does not mandate engineering, competitive bidding or payment
to the City for the costs of the installation of the facilities since the ordinance itself makes
those requirements discretionary through the use of the word "may" and because thecity
never requested such steps be taken.
The focus of the City's brief is it did not receive adequate notice of a claim by
Beckstead. A cursory reading of the October 22, 2004 letter by Beckstead was not only
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sufficient to put the City on notice of his claim for reimbursement, but was more than
adequate to provide the City enough information to prepare a detailed response denying
the claim.
Beckstead has, according to the City Ordinance, five years in which to seek
reimbursement from the City for water connections made to the pipeline he installed.
Beckstead could either file claims for the water connections as he learns of them or he
could wait until five years have elapsed and then file a claim for reimbursement after all of
the water connections during the five-year period had been determined. To require
Beckstead to file a claim upon completion of the pipeline project, as the City proposes,
would have been unreasonable and purposeless. There was nothing to claim at the time
he completed the project since no water connections had yet been made to the pipeline.
The City's position it repealed Ordinance 16.28.030 B through the back door by
enacting Ordinance 461 has no merit. The City did not follow the procedures mandated
by the Idaho Code. Further, Ordinance 461 applies to a different set of circumstances and
does not apply to subdividers, and such a "blanket repeal" without specifically mentioning
the ordinance being repealed would not be effective to invalidate another city ordinance.
The City has received 1,700 feet of pipe looping its water system for which it directly
benefitted and for which it paid nothing. Such circumstances are certainly a windfall to the
City for which it has been unjustly enriched.
All that Beckstead has wanted throughout this entire dispute has been for the City
to obey its own ordinance. Even though the City has made an offer of judgment in this
matter for $5,000.00, such amount does not adequately reimburse Beckstead for even the
costs of the pipe he installed as required by the City. Beckstead should be entitled to the
Memorandum in Response to
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full reimbursement for all of the labor, materials and costs incurred with regards to the
installation of the pipeline, together with attorneys fees and costs as set forth in Idaho
Code § 12-117 which provides a remedy for persons who have "borne unfair and
unjustified financial burdens attempting to correct mistakes agencies should never have
made." Bogner v. State Department of Revenue and Taxation, 107 Idaho, 854,859,693
P.2d 1056 (1061) (1984).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of July, 2007

Attorney for Plaintiffs

I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served on
the 23rd day of July, 2007.

On:
CLYDE G. NELSON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BQX 797
SODA SPRINGS, ID 83276

By:
d MAIL, POSTAGE PRE-PAID

-HAND DELIVERY
d TELEPHONE FACSIMILE

(208) 547-2 I36
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STEVEN R. FULLER - 2995
Steven R. Fuller Law Office
24 North State
P.O. Box 191
Preston, ID 83263
Telephone: (208) 852-2680
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, and
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, individually,

CASE NO. CV-06-390
BECKSTEAD'S SECOND AFFIDAVIT
IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,

CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal
Corporation,
I

I

Defendant.

1

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Franklin

1

1

ss

SCOTT BECKSTEAD, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
1.

I

I am one of the principals of Scott Beckstead Real Estate Company, an

Idaho Corporation, and have personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the
above-entitled action. The statements and representations made in this affidavit are

I

made on my own behalf and as an agent and principal of Scott Beckstead Real Estate
Company.
Beckstead's Second Affidavit in Response to
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2.

1 am the developer of the Creamery Hollow Estates Subdivision, located

on 6thEast and Oneida Streets in Preston, Idaho.

3.

The water connection for Creamery Hollow Estates Subdivision made at

the time I developed the subdivision was to the Preston City water mainline, a six-inch
pipeline running along Oneida Street.
4.

1 was informed by the City I could connect to the six-inch water line on 6'h

East and Oneida Street and that sufficient fire flow existed for such connection,
nevertheless, the City later imposed an additional requirement that I install a pipeline in
one of two locations. I could either replace a four-inch pipe which fed into the six-inch
pipe along Oneida Street, or install a new twelve-inch pipe along 8'h East. (See
Engineer, Darrel Willburn, Memo dated Dec. 31, 2002, attached hereto as Exhibit " A ) .
Either option would have resulted in the construction of an "off-site" improvement, not
connected to my subdivision. Although I believed I was already in compliance with the
City Ordinance since my subdivision would connect to an existing six-inch pipeline, I
agreed to go forward with installing a twelve-inch pipeline along 8'h East, knowing that a
City Ordinance existed which would allow a subdivider to be reimbursed for his costs as
others made connections to the pipeline I was to install.
5.

At no time did the City of Preston require engineering costs'from me and

no engineering costs were ever incurred as part of this project. At no time did the City
require competitive bids for doing the pipeline installation, nor did they ever object to the
costs of the pipe which I submitted to them from which they determined the amount to
pay me for "oversizing" the pipe. The City did not indicate to me the costs I submitted
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were either excessive or extraordinary. At no time did the City require me to pay the
City for the costs of the installation of the pipeline, but instead, I paid for the costs of the
pipeline directly to the vendors and service providers who provided materials or
assisted in the project. At no time did the City of Preston ask me to enter into or
provide me with an "agreement" or other form or contract which they wished me to
review or sign relating to the pipeline project. I was never provided with a form, contract
nor any agreement in writing which the City required to be signed in order to be
reimbursed.

6.

Following the receipt of the City's letter denying my request for

reimbursement, I did speak to Preston City Mayor, Neil Larser~,on at least one
occasion, asking if the City was going to reconsider its position, and further requesting
an opportunity to come before the City Council to discllss the matter. The Mayor
responded he would speak to the City's legal council about the matter and later I was
told their letter of denial would stand and there was no need for a meeting.
7.

All of the water connections made as part of the Creamery Hollow Estates

Subdivision to the Preston City Water System are fully paid for and none have ever
been reimbursed to me. I have obtained no direct or indirect benefit from the
installation of a twelve-inch City water mainline along 8Ih East in Preston, Idaho.
8.

At the time I installed the twelve-inch water mainline for the City of

Preston, I submitted to the City the costs for the purchase of the pipe for the entire
project and the City of Preston was made aware of how much the pipe cost.
9.

1 incorporate herein by reference my Affidavit in Support of my Motion for
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Summary Judgment and the exhibits attached thereto as part of my response to the
City of Preston's Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED thisdday

of July, 2007.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a Notary Public for the State of
Idaho, this &may of July, 2007.

NOTARY PUBLIC for the State of i d 3 0
Residing at: Preston, Idaho
Comm. Exp: 1/21/11
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Beckstead Affidavi
in Response to Defendant's motion for Summary Judgment was served on the &
day of July, 2007.

2

By:

On:
<AIL.
CLYDE G. NELSON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 797
SODA SPRINGS, ID 83276
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City Engineer
Preston City

~o:

Scott Beckstead

Ca

Alex Hudson, P.E.

From

Danell Wllbum

Data:

December 31,2002

RS

Creamery ~ o l l o wSubdivisions - Preliminary Plat

Attached is the city Attorneys review and recommendations for the "Park Area". My
recommendationis his second recornmendation. That is, deed the area to the city for use as
a park, utility easement, and drainage area, then the city can lease it to someone until it is to
be a park.
Modifications lo the preliminary plat map as submitted:
The end of the cul-de-sac's there is to be a 2"-clean-outand the fire hydrants are to be
1.
at the iniersection. (Same as Oakwood phase 3)
2.

Need a flush tap at the end ofthe water main on 6mEast,

3.

Show easement for? East.

4.

Bearing for 1' South does not match bearing as shown on master street location map.

5.

The 2 ac lot with the existing barn is palt of this subdivision.

6.

Notes: 3. Total lots are 30 not.

P&Z has said no more half street improvements! The south end of 6* would need to
7.
be shifted to the east.
8.

Place animal restridions on the this plat and the final plat

Proposed utility improvements are addressed afterthe preliminary plat is accepted. The city
has previously required subdivisions to be feed by at least a 6 inch main from a larger main
(Majestic View). There is a 4 inch pipe which feeds the 6 inch pipe you are proposing to
connect to for this subdivision. The city would propose that either you upgrade the two
blocks of 4 inch pipe with the city paying for any over-sizing, or participate in a new pipe on
'8 East that would then conned y a loop to the 6 inch pipe, or connect the end of your new
6 inch pipe to the water main on 4 south to f o n a loop.

CLYDE O. NELSON

attcrney at Law
172 South Main Street
P.Q. BOX 797
soda Springs, ID 83276
Telephone: (2081 547-2135
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136
I5aho S t a t e Bdar NO. 1197

Attorney far Defendant

SCOTT BECKSTESAD REAL ESTATE,
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,
a?ld Scott: Backstead, Individually

Plaintiff,
vs.

1
)

)
)

CASE NO. C V - 2 0 0 6 - 3 9 0

1
1
1
1

JBRRY C . W S E N I N
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFP'S

)

REPLY TO DEPENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMWkRY

)

JrnGMBNT

CZYY OF PRESTON,
Deftn8nat.

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF

r

)

STATE OF IDAHO

)
)39

County of Franklin

)

C.OtvlES NOW .leny C.Larscn being first duly swum, deposes and says:

1.

I am the City Clerk for the City c f Preston. Idaho.

2.

J have submitled e prior Amdavit in this case, and Iadopt all ofihose statemcn:s
as sct fmh therein.

3.

As City Clerk for the City of Preston, Idaho, I receive dl documents anillor

requose for payment on behalf of the City.
4.

In Psragraphs 5 and 8 of Scott Becksxead's Second Afifidavit in Respansc to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment hc asserts the City did not objecr 10
the costs of the pipe tlrat he pvrcbsscd a ~ the
d $meewere allegedly submincd to
the City. He npmsnts that he submitted to the City his co8i for thc purchasc of
the p i p and the costs ofthe project at the time he installed the pipc or upon

completion of construction.
5.

Ths assertions by Mr. Beckstcad an: incorrcot. Never, did the City receive any
statmcnt, cldm, or invoice from Mr. B~cksteadfor his costs fm purchase of the
pipe or for any labor costs for thc pqiect until MT:Becksicad had filed. suit
agaiwt the City. The City and its representatives were not aware of Mr.
b k s t 4 ' s sl)sgationa of how much was owcd to him for the purciasc of the pipe
and installation of the same untll it was served with +.he Frsr A n ~ e d e dComplaint
in December 2006 or January 2007.

6.

Mr BEoMeed never objected to the payment made by the City to him on
nc~ambcr17,2004,for oversizing, nor did ho claim that he was owcd more for
additional costs to htm for purchase of the pipe or for labor on the project.

DATED this 2Smof July, 2007.

Subscribed a d sworn to before me t h i s w a y of X
.

U~
2007
.

Notary Publidfor Idaho
Residing at
Comrn. ~ x p i r e s - m w ~ : . ,

CLYDE G. NELSON
Attorney at Law
172 South Main Street
P.O. Box 797
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Telephone: (208) 547-2135
Facsimile: ( 2 0 8 ) 547-2136
Idaho State Bar No. 1197
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REaL ESTATE,
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,
and Scott Beckstead, Individually
vs

Plaintiff,

.

)
)
)
I
)
)

)
)

1

CITY OF PRESTON,

)
)

Defendant.

CASE NO.

CV-2006-390

T H X R D AFFIDAVIT OF
DARRELL W X L E W IN
RESPONSE TO PLAfNTIFF'S
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR S-Y
JWDITMENT

1

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) 9s

County of Custer

1

COMES NOW Darrell Wilburn, being first duly sworn, deposes
and says:
1.
I have reviewed Scott Beckstead's Second Affidavit in
Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

In Paragraph 5 of Mr. Beckstead's Second AEfidavit, he
states that the City never objected to the cost of the pipe
when he allegedly submitted the costs to the City in order
the
to determine the amount to pay him for ttoversizing"
pipe. That assertion is incorrect. Mr. Beckstead never
provided the City, or its representatives,
2.

with his costs of the pipe after completion of the line
until he filed the law suit against the City. Mr. Beckstead
was reimbursed for his costs of the pipeline based on
calculations made by me based upon what the City's cost
wouLd be for that pipeline. (See Exhibit A to my First
Affidavit) Tt should be noted from my calculations that thc
C i t y reimbursed him at the rate of $10.50 per root for 12inch line. Mr. Beckstead claims costs as evidenced by
Exhibits B and C to his First Affidavit of $10.91 and $12.23
per foot. Obviously, I did not have Mr. Beckstead's
invoices when I prepared the calculations, nor did Mr.
Beckstead advise me of those costs.

3.
In Paragraph 8 of Mr. Beckstead's Second
~ffidavit,he states he "...submitted to the City the cost
for the purchase of the pipe for the entire project and the
City of Preston was made aware of how much the pipe cost."
That is untrue. Mr. Beckstead does not state to whom he
allegedly submitted these costs. As I was the City
Engineer, they would have been submitted to me, and 1 never
received the same from Mr. Beckstead or any other party.
The City of Preston was unaware of what Mr. Beckstead
claimed to be his costs until he filed suit against the
City. In fact, when Mr. Beckstead first filed suit in late
2006, he claimed that he was owed the sum of $10,603.60. He
now claims in his Second Amended complaint that he is owed
$13,153.64. Never did Mr. Beckstead present the City with
his claimed costs prior to constructing the pipe, at the
time of constructing the pipe, or following the construction
of the pipe until he filed suit in late 2006.

4.

Upon receipt of payment from the City for the
oversizing of the pipe, Mr. Beckstead did not object to the
same or represent to the City that he was owed additional
costs for the pipe or labor.

DATED this 25?"ay

of July, 2007.

Subscribed and sworn t o b e f o r e me this&

Residing a t
Corn. Expires

day of

STEVEN R. FULLER - 2995
Steven R. Fuller Law Office
24 North State
P.O. Box 191
Preston, ID 83263
Telephone: (208) 852-2680
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, and
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, individually,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

CASE NO. CV-06-390

BECKSTEAD'S THIRD AFFIDAVIT IN
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal
Corporation,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO

1

County of Franklin

) ss
)

Comes now, Scott Beckstead, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I have had an opportunity to review the Reply Memorandum to Plaintiff's

Motion for Summary Judgement and the second and third affidavits of Jerry Larsen and
Darrel Willburn.
2.

It is apparently the Defendant's position that the Defendant did not have

Beckstead's Third Affidavit in Response to
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any notice for the costs for which I am seeking reimbursement from the Defendant. In
the Affidavit of Darrel Willburn, he states, "In paragraph 8 of Mr. Beckstead's second
affidavit, he states he

I...

submitted to the City the cost for the purchase of the pipe for

the entire project and the City of Preston was made aware of how much the pipe cost.'
This is untrue".
3.

Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference is a document

dated November 12, 2003, executed by Scott Beckstead, and Darrel Wiilburn and Scott
Martin on behalf of the Defendant. This document indicates the amount of estimated
cost for the 12-inch pipe, the difference paid for oversizing the pipe, and the estimated
balance remaining for the cost of six-inch pipe. This document is submitted as
evidence the Defendant had knowledge at the time the pipeline was installed of the
costs incurred by myself in purchasing the pipe for the project.
DATED this&

&-day of July, 2007.

AND SWORN to before me, a Notary Public for the State of
ay of July, 2007.

i

I
;

I
I

NOTARY PUBLIC for the State of ldaho
Residing at: Preston, ldaho
Comm. Exp: 1/21/11
Becksteass Third Affidavit in Response to
Defendant's Reply to Piainliffs Motion For Summary Judgment - Page 2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Beckstead's Third
Affidavit in Response to Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
was served on the =%ay
of July, 2007.

By:

0 n':

M A I L , POSTAGE PRE-PAID
CLYDE G. NELSON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 797
SODA SPRINGS, ID 83276

Beckstead's Third Affidavit in Response to
Defendanl's Reply to Piaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment - Page 3

HAND DELIVERY
TELEPHONE FACSIMILE
547-2136

-

Creamty Hollow Subdivision 8th East Water Line
Item
Description
1 Subdividers Pipe
2 City Supplied Pipe
3 Valves
4 Saddle &Tap
Differences

Quanity

1240
460
0
0

6" Unit"

$3.27
$3.27
$356.66
$433.85

12" Unit 6" Cost

12" Cost

Difference

$10.50 $4,054.80 $13,020.00 $8,965.20
$0.00 ($1,504.20)
$0.00 $1,504.20
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
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M THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
..".
STATE OF IDMO, IN AND FOR TBE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

SCOTT BECICSTEAD REAL ESTATE
COMPANY, hn Idaho Corporation,

)
) CaseNo.

)
)
)
)

Plainti$
vs.

CV-2006-390

1

1

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
'

ORDER GRANTXNG DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SllMMARY JUDGMENT
ANJit DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal Corporation,)
Defendant,

I.

1
1

The Matter Before the Court

This onse involves a dispute arising after Scott Beokstead (Beckstead) installed a
watel pipeline on 8" East Street in the City of Preston in October 2003. The installation
was done as a prerequisite to development of an unconnected area by Beokstead.
Beckstead now seeks reimbursement for the costs associated with the installation from the
City of Preston (City) under City ordinance 16.28.030. City denies owing the costs ofthe
project, claiming that because Beckstead did not follow the pprocedures outlined in the
City ordinance by not giving timely and adequate notice and failing to enter into a written
oonlract with the City.City also claims that Beckstead failed to give notice under the Tort
Claims Act pursuant to LC. 5 6-906.

\

Scott Beckstead v City of Preston, Memorandum Declslon and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motson for
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Standard of Review,
A party is entitled to summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions and

admissions, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving pasty is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

I.R.C,P. 56(c); Foster v, TPaul, 141 Idaho 890 (2005); U.S. Bank Nut 'l Ass '19 v. Kuenzli,
134 Idaho 122 (2000), The burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of
material fact rests at all times upon the moving party. Jordan v, Beekr;, 135 Idaho 586
(2001); Thompson v. City of Idaho Falls, 126 Id 587 (Ct. App. 1994).
The standards applicable to summary judgment require the COW
to liberally
construe the facts in the record in favor of the nonmoving party and to draw all reasonable
inferences from the facts in favor of the nonmovingparty. Northwest Bec-Corp v. Home
Living Sew., 136 Idaho 835 (2002). If the record contains conflicting inferences or

reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be denied.
Id In addition, a court may properly award summaryjudgment to any party, not just the
moving party, if the circumstances warrant such, Brummeft v. Ediger, 106 Idaho 724

(1984). The fact that both parties have moved for summaryjudgment does not in and of
itself establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact. However, where, as in the
present case, both parties have moved for s m . a r y judgment based upon the heme
evidentiary facts and the same issues and theories, they have effectively stipulated that
there are no genuine issues of material fact and therefore summaryjudgment is
appropriate. Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co.. 100 Idaho 505,507 (1979). Kromrei V. AID Ins
Co., 110 Idaho 549,551 (1986). Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637 (1999). Dunham v.

Hackney Airpark Inc., 133 Idaho 613 (1999).The Court must evaluate each party's motion

for summary judgment on its own merits. Stafford v. IClosterman, 134 Idaho 205,207
(2000).

a%

Scott Beckstead v City of Preston, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment and Granting Defendant's Motlan for Summary Judgment.
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In this case the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material faot in
dispute, Both parties acknowledge that the pipeline was laid and that a City ordinance
allowed for reimbursement of the costs associated with such 'bff site" work, The disputes
in this case revolve around the City's ordinance and whether it was applicable to
Beckstead's situation. The questions regarding the ordinance ate questions of law. The
other issue is whether Beckstead filed aproper and timely claim with the City.
The ordinance gives a subdivider the right to reimbursement for the expenses they
incur for benefiting off site properties. There is a process by which the subdivider
acquires this right. First, the subdidvider may pay the City the costs for installation of any
required facilities. Second, the cost paid to the City is to be determined by competitive
bids solicited by the City along with engineering costs. Tfiird, the costs are verified.
Lastly, the ordinance also requires an agreement between the City and the Devefoper.
Here the City required installation of the pipeline before Beckstead could proceed
on the Creamery Hollow Subdivision, thus it was a required facility. Instead of paying the
City the costs, Beckstead perfoTrned the installation work himself. Because Beckstead did
the work himself there were no competitive bids solicited. The language of the ordinance
is ambiguous in utilizing the permissive word "may". One interpretation states that the
word "may" only modiCres the language in close proximity. Here, the ordinance has a
comma before and after the line "the subdivider may pay the cost of such facilities to the
city", Preston, Idaho, City ovdinance 16.28.030 (B),(1974)(repealed December, 2004).
This could mean that the word "may" only applies to the Subdivider's option of paying
the costs, and does hot pertain to the other requirements of the ordinance. The ambiguity
must be construed against the drafter, however that has little meaning in this case as the
options are either to pay the costs and invoke the ordinance, or not to pay the costs and
forego the reimbursement provided under the ordinance. Beckstead opted to do the work
himself and thus the City was never put on notice as to their option of soliciting

4%

ScofI Beckstead v City of Preston, Memorandum Decis~onand Order Denyins PlaintifPs Motion for
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competitive bids. The City undoubtedly knew of the ordinance because they created it.
Nevertheless, the City has the right to know when a person is invoking the ordinance. By
opting to not pay the City the oosts and do the work himselc Mr. Beckstead faiied to
initiate the ordinance and thereby put the City on notice.
The second step of the ordinance provides amethod by which the costs are to be
determined. There is no evidence that Mr. Beckstead ever formed an agreement with the
City prior, or during this project, by which the City could detexmine the cost of the
project. According to Affidavit in Support ufPlainti@s Motion fur Sumnzary Judgment
Beckstead indicates that he was aware of the ordinance prior to the development of
Creamery Hollow Subdivision. Mr. ~ecksteadknew of the ordinance and could have
opted to pay the costs and bid on the project himsev. The ordinance i s designed to benefit
those who pay for the costs which are solicited by the City. There is no evidence that the
City ever had the opportunity to solicit competitive bids because Mr. Beckstead did not
follow the procedure of the ordinance. He cannot claim reimbursement ex post facto,
Beckstead did verify the costs as indicated in Eechtead's ThirdAffidavit in

Response bo Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Motionfor Summary Judgment. This
verification is dated November 2003 and the pipe was laid in October 2003, after the
work had been done. The language of the ordinance allows for the steps to be taken
"whenever any intervening property is benefited", thus the subsequent verification is
valid, Pveston, Idaho, City ordinance 16.28.030(B),(1974)(repealed December, 2004).
Another issue arises as to whether Beckstead's claim is barred as untimely. This
case is similar to that of Magnuson v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 138 Idaho 166 (2002). In
that case the City prevailed under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (XTCA) LC.

50-219 and

6-906, which state that claims against Municipalities must be filed within 180 days from
when the claim arises. The notice must also be sufficient so as to put the governmental
entity on notice that it is being prosecuted. Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 127 Idaho
565 (1995). Compliance with the ITCA notice requirement is a mandatory condition
precedent to bringing suit, the failure of which is fatal to a claim, no matter how

a71
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legitimate. McQuiZlenv. City ofAnzmon, 113 Idaho 719 (1987). The notice provision of
ITCA also applies to actions against a city for breach of contract, as well as any other
damages claim, tort or otherwise. Enterprise, Inc. v. Nanzpa Ciry,96 Idaho 734 (1975)
heitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568 (1990).This oase falls under the notice requirement of
the ITCA as Mr. Beckstead is seeking damages against the City.
In his Afldavit in Support of P l a i n t r s Motionfor Summary Judgment Beckstead
indicates that he was aware of the ordinance prior to the development of Creamery
Hollow Subdivision. He also indicates that further research revealed that the ordinance
provided for a five year period for reimbursement of costs. The October 22,2004 letter
from Beokstead to City may suffice as a claim putting the City on notice. The City
Attorney subsequently wrote a letter denying Beckstead's request for reimbursement. This
indicates that the City understood the letter to be a claim. However, this notice comes
after the 180 day time limit placed on filing claims against a Municipality. I.C. $6-906
A Municipal Corporation may not enact ordinances which conflict with State law.

I.C. $50-301. Therefore, I.C, § 6-609 will control as between the 5 year period granted by
the City ordinance and the 180 day deadline and Beckstead is subject to the 180 day
deadline. This is the oase even if Beckstead complied with the City ordinance.

In this case, the Plaintiff's notice came when Beckstead wrote a letter to City on
October 22,2004. This was a year after the pipeline construction had been completed.
The argument that Beckstead could not make a claim until he learned of connections to
fhe pipeline is inconsequential to the issue because the City's ordinance only mandates
reimbursement for costs to the subdivider. Preston, Idaho, City ordinance 16.28.030
@),(1974)(repealed December, 2004).
Beckstead lcnew the costs of the project onNovember 12,2003, as evidenced by
Beckstead's TkirdAfldavit in Response to Defendrant's Reply to Plaintz@s Motionfor
Summary Judgment 7 3 where Beckstead states, "Defendant had knowledge at the time
the pipeline was installed of the costs incurred by myself in purchasing the pipe for fhe
project." This necessitates Beclcstead's knowledge of the costs as well. If the City is

27%
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expected to be able to discern the costs ofthe project from this Mr. Beckstead should be
held to at least that same standard, The attached invoice for the pipe cost is signed by the

City Engineer on November 12,2003, after the labor had been performed. Beckstead
failed to make his claim at the same time he submitted the invoice despite having
lsnowledge of the cost and the project being finished. Mr. Beckstead did not meet the 180
day deadline because the letter was not sent until October 22,2004, almost a year later.
The attachment in Beckstead's Third ASfidavit in Response to Defendant's RepZy to

PlaintifS Mofionfor Summary Judgment dated November 12,2003, marked the
beginning of the 'lolling because Beckstead was l l l y apprised at that rime of the injury
and damages as well as the government's role. Doe

V.

Durtschi, 1 I0 Idaho 466 (1986).

Plaintiffs claim is barred under LC, $ 6-906 and the 180 day time limit for claims against
Municipalities.
IV.

Conclusion

IT xs mnEEJi ORDEW, ~ J U D G E DAND
,
DECREED that for the
forgoing reasons, the Motionfi Sumrna~yJudgine~ltof the Plaintiffs is DENIED.

IT IS IWRTmA ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

/69day of August, 2007.

&2
.
w

DON L, HARDING
District Judge

V
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CLERI('S CERTIFICATE OR SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY .that on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document on the attomey(s) or person(s) listed below in the manner
indicated.
Atto~ney(s)/Persons(s):

M&od of Service:

Steven R. Fuller
Steven R. Fuller Law Office
24 North State
Post Office Box 191
Preston, Idaho 83263
Telephone; (208) 852-2680
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683

[ ] U.S. MaillPostage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[t.TFaosimiIe
[ ] Hand Delivered

Clyde G.Nelson
City of Preston
Attorney at Law
172 South Main Street
Post Office Box 797
Sods.Springs, Idaho 83276
Telephone: (208) 547-2135
Facsimile: (208) 547.2136

[ ] U.S. MailPostage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[gF~simile
[ ] Hand Delivered

R A W this

&day of August, 2007.
V. ELLIOT LARSEW
Clerk of theDistrict Court

By:

$L/I~O,
#(I

deputy Clerk
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l[R THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JURICXAI, DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO,IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

SCOTT BECKSTEAD RBAL ESTATE
COMPANY,An Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff,
V6

1
) Case No.

)
)
)

CV-2006-390

JUIOQMEN'F

1

.

)

CITY OF PRESTON, aMunicipal
Corporation,

1
1
1
)

Defendant.

)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERCD,ADJUDGED AND DECREED pursuant to this Court's
Memorandu~nDecision and Ordevf ia chis case, dated August 16,2007, that Judgment i s
hereby entered in favor of the City of Preston, Defendant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

&Dday of August, 2007.

P. 1/2
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the date below, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document on the attorney(s) or person(s) listed below in the manner indicated.

Attorney(s)lPersons(s):

Method of Senice:

Clyde G,Nelson
City of Preston
Attorney at Law
172 South Main Street
Post OfBoe Box 797
Soda Springs, Idaho 83276
Telephone: (208) 547-2135
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136

[ ] US.MailPostage Prepaid
[ 1 Overnight Mail

Steven R. Fuller
STEVEN R. FULLER LAW OFFICE
24 North State
Post Office Box 191
Preston, Idaho 83263
Telephone: (208) 852-2680
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683

[ ] U.S. MailPostage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[)(3 Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Court Box

[)(1 Facsimile

[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Court Box

DATED ihis j(D day o f August, 2007,
V. ELLIOTT LARSEN

Clerk of the District Court
By:
Deputy Clerk

CLYDE G. NELSON
Attorney at Law
172 South Main Street
P.O. Box 797
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Telephone: (208) 547-2135
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136
Idaho Stare Bar No. 1197
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANIUIN

1
1
1
1
1

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE,
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,
and Scott Beckstead, Individually
Plaintiff,

vs .

)

1
1
1
1

CITY OF PRESTON,
Defendant.

CASE NO. CV-2006-390

MOTION FOR COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES

COMES NOW, Clyde G. Nelson, Attorney for Defendant City of Preston, and hereby
moves that the court award attorney fees and costs as against the Plaintiffs Scott Beckstead Real
Estate Company and Scott Beckstead, Individually, pursuant to Rule 54, I.R.C.P., Rule 68,
I.R.C.P., 512-117, $12-120, and 512-121, Idaho Code.
This Motion is based upon the judginent entered by the court in favor of the Defendant
City of Preston on August 16, 2007, wherein the Defendant is the prevailing party. This Motion
is supported by the Affidavit of Clyde G. Nelson attached hereto together with the Mernora~ldutn
of Costs and Attorney Fees.
DATED t h i a a y of August, 2007.

RlOTION FOR COSTS

1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I I-IEREBY CERTIFY that on t h i m day of August, 2007, I served a tlue and correct
copy of the foregoing docume~~t
upon the following by US Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
Steven R. Fuller
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 191
Preston, ID 83263

AFFIDAVIT

CLYDE G. NELSON
Preston City Attorney
172 South Main Street
P.O. Box 797
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Telephone: (208) 547-2 135
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136
Idaho State Bar No. 1197
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

1

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE,
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,
and Scott Becltstead, Individually

1
CASE NO. CV-2006-390

1
1
1
1
1
1

Plaintiff,
vs .

CITY OF PRESTON,
Defendant.

State of IDAHO

1

County of Caribou

)

AFFIDAVIT

:ss

COMES NOW Clyde G. Nelson, Attomey at Law, Soda Springs, Idaho, Attorney for
Defendant, and upon oath duly deposes and says: .
1.

I an attorney for the City of Preston, Idaho:

2.

I charge the City of Preston the fee rate of $90.00 per hour, and all l~ourlycharges as set
forth in the Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees made a part of Defendant's Motion
for Attorney Fees and Costs are true and correct to the best of nly lmowledge. Said fee
rate is in conformance with or less than that charged by other attorneys with your affiant's
experience in the Southeast portion of Idaho.

3.

On or about February 13,2007, I sent a letter to Steven R. Fuller, Attorney for Plaintiff
wherein the City of Preston, Idaho, did offer to settle the case for the sum of $4,000.00
payable to Mr. Beckstead. A copy of that'letter is attached hereto and tuade a part of this
Affidavit as Exhibit "A".

AFFIDAVIT OF CLYDE NELSON
FEES AND COSTS

1

4.

011February 15, 2007, Steven R. Fuller sent a letter to me rejecting tlie offer made by tile
City of Preston. A true copy of that letter is attached hereto and made a part of this
Affidavit as Exhibit "B".

5.

On February 16, 2007 I mailed and faxed an Offer of Judgment dated February 16, 2007
to Steven R. Fuller wherein the City of Preston did offer judgment in the sum of
$5,000.00 as against it. A copy of the facsimile transmittal Inelno dated February 16,
2007, showing that said Offer of Judgment was faxed to M i . Fuller at 4 5 5 P.M. and that
the same was mailed on the same date is attached hereto together with the Offer of
Judgment as Exhibit "C".

6.

No reply was made by the Plaintiff or Mr. Fuller to the Offer of Judgment.

7.

Pursuant to the Rules and Code Sections set fort1 in Defendant's Motion, the Defendant is
entitled to recover its costs and attorney fees incurred in this matter.
DATED t h i w y of August, 2007

SWSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before &e this

day

Residing at Soda Springs

AFFIDAVIT OF CLYDE NELSON
FEES AND COSTS

,2007.

CITY O F PRESTON
CLYDE G . NELSON
CITY ATTORNEY
1 7 2 S . Main
Box 797
SODA SPRINGS, IDAHO 8 3 2 7 6

P. 0 .

TELEPHONE
12081 5 4 7 - 2 1 3 5

February 13,2007

Facsimile (208) 852-2683

, ,

Steven R. Fuiler
Attorney at Law
P.O.Box 191
Preston, ID 83263
Re: Bechtead v. City of Preston
Case No. CV-06-390

Dear Steve,

I conferred with the City Council last night at its City Council meeting as to whether a
meeting with Scott Beckstead would be productive at this stage. Council decided that as suit had
been filed, that the Council would prefer that the attorneys handle this matter. I would appreciate
a quick response as to whether the offer for settlement in the sum of $4,000.00 is acceptable to
Scott. I would like to have your response before I prepare an .Answer to the Complaint and
Response to your Discovery.
The City Council did state that it would consider an alternative settlement by which Scott
would be paid a portion of the amount he alleges is owing him based on the number of lots that
he owned wh'ich were benefitted by the improvement and the potential number of lots which
could be benefitted by the improvements. Darrell Wilburn has advised me that there are 32
potential water connections of which five have already been made. Scott has 22 lots within his
subdivision. The total number of lots would be 54. Scott was benefitted by the improvements by
40.7% of the total expenditufe, and the intervening lots were benefitted to the tune of 59.3%.
Scott estimates his cost at $10,600.00. Thus, Scott would be entitled to reimbursement in the
sum of $6,285.80. Each intdrvening connection would pay the sum of $196.43 with the city
paying that sum per lot for the five lots which have already been connected. The city would
charge future intervenino, connections the sum of $196.43 for the improvement, and that sum
would be paid directly to Scott upon the connection being made. The agreement would run for
a period of five years from the date of completion of the water line improvements by Scott.

Steven R. Fuller
Re: Scott Beckstead v. City of Preston
February 13,2007
Page -2-

After the five years have expired, the city would no longer be under any obligation to collect said
sum from intervening users or to pay said sum to Scott. In the alternative, Scott could accept the
$4,000.00, sign a release, and dismiss the suit with prejudice.
Again, I would appreciate a prompt response as I must &aft the Response to your
Discovery and Answer to your Complaint. The City CounciI appreciates the efforts being made
by Scott and you to resolve this matter.
Sincerely,

/ffl&#7
Clv

CGN:wr
cc: C i t y o f P r e s t o n

. Nelson

STEYEN R. FULLER LAW OFEICE
~ c o m c y sand Coi~~sclors
at Law
:J

hORTH STATE

* P.O. BOX 191

t

PUSTOK. ID,\liO 53263

STEYEN R FULLER'
R. TODD CARBETI'

February 15,2007

Clyde G.Nelson
Attorney at Law
P.O.Box 797
Soda Springs, ID 83276
SENT VIA TELEPHONE FACSIMILE 12081 547-2136

Re: Becksfead v. City of Preston
Franklin County Case Ng. CV-06-390
Dear Clyde:
I am in receipt of your loiter of February 13, 2007 and have had the opportunity cf
reviewing the same with Scott Beckstead.

We appreciate the offer that has been made, however, Scott has indicated to me I must
respectfully deciine the same.
I believe we need to proceed with the case so that it will be ready for trial in July. It may
be that some, if not all of the issues may be resolved through summary judgment.
Would you please provide your answers to discovery and an answer to the complaint so
that the case will be at issue.

.

Sincerelv.,

Steven R. Fuller
Attorney at Law

cc: Scott Beckstead

CITY OF PRESTON
CLYDE G. NELSON
CITY ATTORNEY
P.O. BOX 797,'172 5. MAIN
SODA SPRINGS, ID 83276

Telephone
(208) 547-21 35

Facsimile
(208) 547-2 136

FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL MEMO

.........................................................................
DATE:

February 16, 2007

TO:

Steven R. Fuller
Attorney at Law
Preston, I D 83263

FAX:

(208) 852-2683

RE:

Beckstead v: City of Preston

1

3

NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER PAGE:

COMMENTS:

HARD COPY TO FOLLOW VIA U.S. MAIL

X

YES

NO

IF Y O U D O NOT RECEIVE ALL PAGES OF TRANSMISSION, PLEASE CALL

(208) 547-2135 AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THANK YOU FOR YOUR QUICK RESPONSE.
THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS TRANSACTION IS PRIVILEGED A N D
CONFIDENTIAL. IT IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ENTITY NAMED
ABOVE. IF THE READER Q F THIS MESSAGE 15 NOT THE INTENDED RECIPIENT, YOU ARE HEREBY
AOTIFIED
THAT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION OR COPY OF THIS COMMUNICATION IS
STKICT..Y PllOrl 3 -E!J B Y LAW I F YOU FAVE RECEIVED Tl-ilS C0~riMUhlCATlOrjIN ERROR,
F .EASE k O T i\'S 'NIwE3 ATELY BY TELEPIiOhE A h D RETLRN THE ORlGlnAL MESSAGE TO L.5
AT THE ABOVE ADDRESS VIA U.S. POSTAL SERVICE.

-

CLYDE G. NELSON

Preston City Attorney
172 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 797
Soda Springs, ID. 83276
Telephone: (208) 547-2135
Fax: (208) 547-2136
Idaho State Bar No.1197
Attorney for: Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH jCTDIC1,ALDISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE,

)

T
,

):

Case NP. CV-06-390

)

OFFER OF JUDGMENT

Plairitiff,
VS

CITY OF PRESTON,

)

Defendant.

..............................

)

COMES NOW, CLYDE G. NELSON, attorney for Defendant, the City

of Preston, Idaho, and hereby makes an Offer of Judgment to
Plaintiff pursuant to Rule 68 I.R.C.P. in the sum of $5,000.00.
Said offer includes all claims recoverable, including any attorney
fees or costs recoverable under Rule 54(e) (I), Rule 54(d) (l),
Section 12-117, I.C. or other applicable statue or rule which have
accrued up to the date of the Offer of Judgment.
DATED:

This

day of

1;

ney for City of Pres

OFFER O F JUDGMENT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of t h e foregoing
O f f e r of Judgment was s e r v e d by f i r s t class mail, postage p r e p a i d ,
o r f a c s i m i l e , o r hand d e l i v e r e d - o n t h i s 1 6 t h day of February, 2 0 0 7 .

Steven R . F u l l e r
Attorney a t Law
P.O. B o x 1 9 1
Preston, I D 83263
Facsimile ( 2 0 8 ) 852-2683

C x I

U.S.

no
Wendy D . ~ a s d u + e n

OFFER OF JUDGMENT

Mail

x I Facsimile
I
I Hand Delivered
[

ur3 L

C

L

~

CLYDE G. NELSON
Attorney at Law
172 South Main Street
P.O. Box 797
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Telephone: (208) 547-2135
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136
Idaho State Bar No. 1197
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

1

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE,
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,
and Scott Beckstead, Individually

)

1
1
1

Plaintiff,
vs.

)

CITY OF PRESTON,
Defendant.

1
1
1
1

CASE NO. CV-2006-390

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
AND ATTORNEY FEES

Pursuant to Rule 54(d)(5) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the Plaintiffs submit the
within the Memorandum of Costs iteinizing each claimed expense, cost, and disbwsements
incurred by these proceedings:

DESCRIPTION

+

AMOUNTS

See Itemized Billing Statemeilt attached
hereto and made a part of this Memorandum.

$ 7,814.50

TOTAL

$ 7,814.50

Dated t h i s a d a y of

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS

a /#- ,2007.

STATE OF IDAHO )
:ss
County of Caribou )
I, Clyde G. Nelson, being first and duly swonl up011 oat11 duly depose and say:
I am the Attorney for the City of Preston, Idaho in the above elltitled action, I have read
the foregoing Memorandum of Costs, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, the iteills are
correct and the costs and attorney fees claimed are in coinplia~cewit11 Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure; and the facts therein stated are true and correct to tile best of illy lu~owledge.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this&

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS

day o

CLYDE G. NELSON
Attorney at Law
P . 0 . Box 797 - 172 S. Main Street
Soda Springs, ID 83276

August 23,2007

City of Preston
70 West Oneida
Preston, ID 83263

Our File: 2PRESTON.BECKSTEAD

Statement of Account for Services Relidered Through August 23,2007
RE:

Scott Beckstead vs. City of Preston

Professional Services

12111/06

Telephoile conference w/ICRMP

0.50

45.00

12/27/06

Telepholle confereilce w/Steve Fuller; attorney for Scott
Beckstead

0.25

22.50

Preparatioil of Notice of Appearance; Letter to Steve Fuller;
Letter to Clerk of Court for filing of Notice
01/08/07

Telephone coiiference w/Steve Fuller

0 1/22/07

Review Letter received from Steve Fuller

01/23/07

Telephone conference w/Steve Fuller

01/25/07

Status Conferene w/Judge Harding and Steve Fuller - Court
Scheduling Conference for Beckstead vs. Preston

01/30/07

Telephone conference w/Steve Fuller
Review and Calendar Trial Schedule

02/05/07

Review Letter received from Steve Fuller

02/13/07

Letter to Steve Fuller

Page 2
August 23,2007
City of Preston
Scott Beckstead vs. City of Preston
Our File: 2PRESTON.BECKSTEAD

Description
Review Letter received from Steve Fuller
Prepare and Send Offer of Judgment to Steve Fuller
Review Beckstead File; Make Notes and Prepare Initial
DraA of Answer and Response to Discovery
Conference w/Darrell Wilbum, Jerry Larsen and Linda
Acock prior to City Council Meeting regarding Beckstead
Case to prepare Answer and Response to Discovery
Further Preparation of Answer; Further Preparation of
Response to Request for Discovery; Review and Revise
Revise Response to Request for Discovery; Make Copies of
Response and Exhibits; Prepare Documents for Signatures
and Filing with Court and sending to Steve Fuller
Revise Answer to 1st Amended Co~nplaintof Beckstead
02/28 - 0 1101 Preparation of Interrogatories to Plaintiff
Beckstead; Review and Revise
Letter to Steve Fuller; Letter to Clerk of Court
Letter to Jerry Larsen requesting connecton fees
Telephone conference w/Dmell Wilbur~l;Telephone
conferences w/Jeny Larsen (3); Telephone conferences
w/Randy Quinn (2); Telephone conference w/Alex Hudson
Telephone conference w/Darrell Wilburn; Review
Beckstead Case File; Letter to Steve Fuller
Telephone conferences w/Steve Fuller (2); Telephone
conference w/Mayor Larson
Telephone conference wIJudge Harding; Telephone
conference w/Steve Fuller; Prepare Notice of Telephonic
conference on Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Conlplaint
Research amd Preoaration for Hearine and Areument:
Telephone ~onfe;ence w/Judge Hard;lg and %eve ~ u l l e r
regarding Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint - 2nd
Amendment

Page 3
August 23,2007
~ i tofi resto on
Scott Beckstead vs. City of Presto11
Our File: 2PRESTON.BECKSTEAD

05/19 - 05/21 Review 2nd Ainended Complaint; Prepare
Answer to 2nd Amended Complaint; Prepare Disclosure of
Witnesses and Exhibits; Prepare Supplelnental Disclosure;
Prepare Notice of Service; Letter to Clerk of Court; Letter
to Steve Fuller
Telephone conference w/Steve Fuller
Preparation of Stipulation and 0rder.to Extend time to File
Motions for Summary Judgment
Letter to Judge IHarding
06/14 - 06/19 Further Research for Beckstead Case; Draft
Motion for Summary Judgment; P)repare Affidavits and
Memorandum
Preparation of Motion to Continue Hearing Date on
Argument for Summary Judgment; Prepare Notice of
Hearing; Letter to Clerk of Court
Conference w/Darrell Wilbur11Discuss Beckstead Case and
Affidavit
Telephone conference w/Steve Fuller
Prepare for Hearing on Motion to Continue Trial;
Telephonic Conference Call with Judge Harding and Steve
Fuller - Hearing on Motion to Continue
Prepare Notes for File on Collfernce Call1 Prepare
Stipulation; Prepare Order
Review Atncnded Trial Schedule and Calendar
Review Plaintiff's Brief and Affidavit of Scott Beckstead;
Prepare Notes for Reply
07118 - 07119 Prepare Defendant's Reply Me~nor~ladum;
Review and Revise; Prepare Affidavit of Darrell Wilbunl;
Prepare Affidavit of Clyde Nelson
File Beckstead Case Reply Brief with Court in Preston
File Beckstead Reply Brief with Court in Preston

Hours

Anlount

8.00

720.00
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August 23,2007
City of Presto11
Scott Beckstead vs. City of Preston
Our File: 2PRESTON.BECICSTEAD

Description

&

Amount

07/24/07

Review Beckstead Response BrieT; Telephone conferences
w/Darrell Wilbur11 (2); Prepare Affidavit of Darrell
Wilburn; Prepare Affidavit of Jerry Larsen

2.00

180.00

07/25/07

Prepare Oral Argument on Summary Judgment

4.00

360.00

07/26/07

Court appearance - Oral Argument on-SuixnnaryJudgment

3.50

315.00

08/21/07

Review Memorandum and Decision

0.70

63.00

08/22/07

Preparation of Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees;
Preparation of Affidavit and Memorandum; Letter to Clerlc
of Court; Letter to Steve Fuller

4.00

360.00

85.75

$ 7,717.50

Summary of Services

Total Professional Services

Costs and Disbursements
Date
-

Description

Amoult

12/28/06

Filing Fee paid to Franklin County Clerk of Court - Notice of Appearance

58.00

02/28/07

Filiilg Fee - Answer to 1st Amended Complaint

14.00

08/22/07

Estimated Costs of Postage for Mailing Answer and Response to Discovery
and Exhibits, Motion for Summary Judgment, Response Briefs, Affidavit
and Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees

25.00

Total Costs and Disbursemeilts

TOTAL NEW CHARGES

$

97.00

$ 7,814.50
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August 23,2007
City of Preston
Scott Beckstead vs. City of Preston
Our File: 2PRESTON.BECKSTEAD
-

--

Previous Balance Due

SUMMARY OF ACCOUNT
Balance Forward
Total New Charges
Payments and Credits
TOTAL BALANCE DUE *** PLEASE PAY THIS AMOUNT **

Aged Balance
TOTAL

Current
7814.50

Over 30
0.00

Over 60
0.00

Over 90
0.00

Total
7814.50

STEVEN R. FULLER - 2995
Steven R. Fuller Law Office
24 North State
P.O. Box 191
Preston, ID 83263
Telephone: (208) 852-2680
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE
COMPANY, an ldaho Corporation, and
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, individually,

CASE NO. CV-06-390

Plaintiffs,
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR COSTS AND
ATTORNEYS FEES
CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal
Corporation,
Defendant.

I

COMES NOW, Scott Beckstead Real Estate Company, an ldaho Corporation,
and Scott Beckstead, individually, Plaintiffs, by and through counsel of record, Steven
R. Fuller, and hereby objects to the City of Preston's (hereafter "City") motion for costs
and attorneys fees, as follows:
The City's motion for attorneys fees and costs is based upon Rule 54 I.R.C.P.,
Rule 68, I.R.C.P., Section 12-117, Section 12-120, and Section 12-121, ldaho Code
The City has also submitted an affidavit of counsel in support of the motion. No

Objection - Page 1

memorandum or brief was submitted with the motion. Plaintiffs will review each of the
rules and statutes cited by the City as part of this objection.
Section 12-120 Idaho Code

Section 12-120 provides for an award of attorneys fees to a prevailing
party in specific situations. Cases involving amountsunder $25,000.00, open accounts,
commercial transactions and some personal injury actions. The City does not state,
specifically which section of the statute it wishes to invoke.
Although the City inserted a standard or general request for attorney fee
clause in its Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint, no request for attorneys fees was made in
the City's Motion for Summary Judgment. Since the issue was not raised by the City,
the Plaintiffs had no opportunity to respond to such a demand in their briefing to the
Court. The Plaintiffs made their own request for attorneys fees in its briefing and the
only mention of attorneys fees and costs in the City's briefing was in its Reply
Memorandum arguing that Plaintiff should not be awarded attorneys fees and costs in
this case.
It is incumbent upon the City to ask for the relief it seeks in a Motion for
Summary Judgment, including attorneys fees and costs if such are requested. The
Court's own Memorandum Decision makes no mention of attorneys fees and costs
being awarded to the City since it was not an issue raised by the City in its Motion. To
now demand an award of attorneys fees and costs without having made such a
demand part of its Motion or briefing places the Plaintiffs at a disadvantage and would
allow the City to come in through the back door instead of the front, unfairly raising the
issue after having not requested it in the first place. Our appellate courts have ruled
Objection - Page 2

ldaho Code Section 12-120(1) must be narrowly construed. Anderson v. Goodliffe, 140
ldaho 446, 449, 95 P.3d 64 (2004). Such narrow construction placed on the statute by
our courts makes the necessity of requesting an award under this section imperative
In Garner v.Barschi, 139 ldaho 430,438,80 P.3d 1031 (2003), a case
with which this Court should be familiar, the Supreme Court upheld a denial of an
award of attorneys fees stating:
A party claiming attorneys fees must assert the specific statute, rule,
or case authority for its claim. MDS Investmenfs, L.L.C. v. State, 138
ldaho 456, 465, 65 P.3d 197, 206 (2003). It is not sufficient to make a
generalized request for attorneys fees. Crea v. FMC Corp., 135 ldaho
175, 181, I 6 P.3d 272, 272 (2000). It is incumbent on the moving
partv to assert the arounds upon which it seeks an award of
attornevs fees. The District Judae is not empowered to award fees
on a basis not asserted bv the movincl pam. id.(quoting Bingham v.
Montane Resource Assoc., 133 ldaho 420,424,987 P.2d 1035,1039
(1999). (emphasis added)

The City, as the moving party in this case, did not assert any grounds nor
any request for attorneys fees in its motion.

Section 12-117, ldaho Code
ldaho Code Section 12-117 provides for an award of attorneys fees and
costs in which a City is involved, ..."If the Court finds that the party against whom the
judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Again, the City
did not request attorneys fees and costs under this Section of the Code in its Motion for
Summary Judgment or briefing to the Court. .The absence of such a request is a flaw
which the Court should not overlook and it would be error to award attorneys fees and
costs under Section 12-117 or Section 12-120, ldaho Code, since they were not
requested in the City's Motion in the first place.
Objection - Page 3

As the Court is aware from the facts of this case, it would be difficult to
ascribe to the Plaintiffs that they were not reasonable in bringing a claim to the City for
the pipeline installed by the Plaintiffs at Plaintiffs cost when a City Ordinance in effect at
the time provided for reimbursement to the Plaintiffs for such costs. Although the Court
has ruled the Plaintiffs should have filed a Notice of Claim within 120 days from when
the project was completed, it cannot be said to be unreasonable for the Plaintiffs have
made their claim when money was actually owed. At the completion of the project, no
money was owed to the Plaintiffs, since monies would only be owed under the City
Ordinance when water connections were made to the pipeline put in place by the
Plaintiffs. It seemed illogical to the Plaintiffs to be required to file a claim which the City
would have summarily denied since nothing was owed at the time of the project's
completion. The Plaintiffs had a reasonable basis to believe a claim would arise only
when a connection was made to the pipeline he had installed, if such a connection was
ever made. The first connection was not made until a year later when the Plaintiffs
made their claim for reimbursement. Until that time, there was no reimbursement to be
made.

Rule 68 I.R.C.P.
Rule 68, I.R.C.P. is not applicable to this case. When an offer of
judgment is made by the City, the purpose of that offer is to curtail an award of
attorneys fees to the Plaintiff should the Plaintiff prevail in the case and receive as a
judgment an amount equal to or less than the amount made in the offer of judgment. In
this case, the City of Preston made an offer of judgment for the sum of $5,000.00, but
that does not entitle the City to an award of attorneys fees because such offer was
Objection'- Page 4

made and the Court ruled against the Plaintiff. Rule 68, I.R.C.P. was not intended to
provide for an award of attorneys fees. Ireland v. Ireland, 123 ldaho 955, 855 P.2d 40
(1993). The rule is intended to protect a defendant against a plaintiff's claim for costs
where the defendant has made an offer of judgment and the verdict recovered by the
plaintiff is less favorable than the offer. The Rule does not include an award of
attorneys fees to the offeror. Vulk v. Haley, 112, ldaho 855, 736 P.2 1309 (1987).
ldaho Code Section 12-121 and Rule 5 4 ( e ) l l )I.R.C.P.
ldaho Code Section 12-1'21 provides for an award of attorneys fees
in a civil action to a prevailing party, however, Rule 54(e)(l) states that attorneys fees
under ldaho Code Section 12-121 "...may be awarded by the Court only when it finds,
from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation; ..." In order for a Court to award
attorneys fees and costs under the statute and rule, the City would have to reach the
high standards set under Rule 54(e)(l) I.R.C.P.
Under similar arguments made previously regarding ldaho code,
Section 12-117, it would be stretching the rules to their breaking point to state the
Plaintiffs' actions were frivolous or without just basis or cause. The claimant had a
legitimate reason for wanting to be reimbursed for costs of the pipeline constructed by
him. The Court's ruling that he should have filed his claim after the construction was
completed is a matter for debate, as evidenced by both the facts and circumstances
and the law of the case. It was not unreasonable for the Plaintiffs to believe he should
have made his claim when monies became due after the first water connections were
made to the pipeline he constructed. Had no water connections been made to the
Objection - Page 5

pipeline, he would have had no claim for reimbursement at all under the City
Ordinance. The Court's unfavorable ruling does not change the fact that the claim was
legitimate and the time of the filing of the claim is subject to reasonable debate.

Amount of the Claim for Attornevs Fees and Costs
As to the costs claimed as a matter of right by the City in this
action, under Rule 54(d)(l) I.R.C.P., such as the filing fees paid, Plaintiffs have no
objection. However, estimated costs for postage in the amount of $25.00 is not a cost
listed as being allowed under Rule 54(d)(l)(C) I.R.C.P., nor are "estimated" costs
allowed but only those costs actually incurred which can be proven or shown.
Under Rule 54(e)(3) I.R.C.P., the Court is required to consider
certain factors in determining the amount of an award of attorneys fees. These are: (A)
The time and labor required; (B) The novelty and difficulty with the questions; (C) The
skill required to perform the legal service properly and the experience and the ability of
the attorney in the particular field of law; (D) The prevailing charges for like work; (E)
Whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (F)

he time limitations imposed by the client or

the circumstances of the case; (G) the amount involved and the results obtained; (H)
The undesirability of the case; (I) The nature and length of the professional relationship
with the client; (J) Awards in similar cases; (K) The reasonable cost of automated legal
research, if the Court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case; (L)
Any other factor which the Court deems appropriate in the particular case.
None of the above factors which are to be considered by the Court were
addressed in the City's motion. It is incumbent upon the City to present sufficient
information for the Court to consider the factors required under the rules in order to
Objection - Page 6

obtain an award of attorneys fees. Hackett v. Streeter, 109 Idaho 261, 264, 706 P.2d
1372 (1985) The affidavit of the City's counsel addresses issues of settlement offers
made and in particular, the offer of judgment which has already been addressed in this
objection. A settlement offer, or an offer of judgment, should not be considered as a
basis for an award of attorneys fees.
It should be noted that the City is seeking an award of attorneys fees which is
approximately two-thirds of the entire amount involved in this claim. Such an award
would be disproportionate and excessive when compared to the amount involved. The
Court is required to take into account the amount involved in the case in determining
what would be a fair award of attorneys fees, if such are granted. Rule 54(e)(3)(G).

Summary.
Absent a request for attorneys fees and costs in its Motion for
Summary Judgment, the City should not be granted such fees or costs. The claim
made by the Plaintiffs was not unreasonable and the time period for filing a tort claim
with the City is subject to reasonable debate. The amount of attorneys fees requested
is excessive, especially given the amount at issue in the case.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that the City's motion for attorneys fees and costs
be denied.
DATED this

f iday of September, 2007.

Attorney for Plaintiffs

Objection - Page 7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY was served on the &day
of September, 2007.

By:

On:

CLYDE G. NELSON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 797
SODA SPRINGS, ID 83276

(/

MAIL, POSTAGE PRE-PAID

-HAND DELIVERY
v" 'TELEPHONE FACSIMILE
(208) 547-2136
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STEVEN R. FULLER - 2995
Steven R. Fuller Law Office
24 North State
P.O. Box 191
Preston, ID 83263
Telephone: (208) 852-2680
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE
COMPANY, an ldaho Corporation, and
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, individually,

CASE NO. CV-06-390

PlaintiffsIAppellants,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
VS.

ClTY OF PRESTON, a Municipal
Corporation,

TO:

THE CITY OF PRESTON AND ITS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, CLYDE G.
NELSON AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
Notice is hereby given that:

1.

Apoeal. The above-named Appellants, Scott Beckstead Real Estate

Company, an ldaho Corporation, and Scott Beckstead, individually, appeal against the
above-named Respondent, City of Preston, a Municipal Corporation, to the ldaho
Supreme Court from the final Judgment entered in the above-entitled action on the 16'h
day of August, 2007, the Honorable Don L. Harding, presiding.
Notice of Appeal

- Page 1

2.

Riuht to Appeal. The Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho

Supreme Court, and the Judgment or Order described in paragraph 1 above is an
appealable judgment and order under and pursuant to Rule Il(a)(l), I.A.R.
Preliminarv Statement of Issues on A ~ p e a l . (1) Whether or not the

3.

Appellants complied with the requirements of Preston City Ordinance 16.28.030(8). (2)
Whether or not Appellants filed a timely claim' under the idahc Tort Claims Act.
4.

Is a Reporter's Transcript Requested?

N'o.

5.

Clerk's Record. The Appellants request that the following documents to

be included in the Clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule
28, I.A.R.
(a) All briefs, affidavits with exhibits, memoranda, orders, minute entries,
memorandum decision by the Court, motions and other documentation contained in the
Court file.
Service. I certify:

6.

(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Clerk of
the District Court:
(b) That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been
paid;
(c) That the Appellant filing fee has been .paid;

(d) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20 I.A.R.

Notice of Appeal

- Page 2

@

day of September, 2007.

DATED this

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF
APPEAL was served on the &day
of September, 2007.
On:

By:
MAIL, POSTAGE PRE-PAID
HAND DELIVERY
TELEPHONE FACSIMILE

Clerk of the District Court
Franklin County, Idaho
39 East Oneida
Preston, ID 83263

7

Clyde G. Nelson
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 797
Soda Springs, ID 83276

L
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

!Ji:pit'i .i

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

******

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, and
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, individually,

Supreme Court No.
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL

VS.

CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal
Corporation,

Appeal from:

Sixth Judicial District, Franklin County
Honorable Don L. Harding

Case number from court: CV-06-390
Order or judgment appealed from:

Attorney for Appellant:

Memorandum Decision and Order
Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs Motion
for Summary Judgment AND Judgment

Steven R. Fuller
Steven R. Fuller Law Ofice
PO Box 191
Preston, ID 83263

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL- 1

Attorney for Respondent: Clyde G. Nelson
Attorney at Law
PO Box 797
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Appeal by: Plaintiffs
Appeal against: Defendants
Notice of Appeal filed: September 25, 2007
Appellate fee paid: Yes
Request for additional (clerk's) record filed: No
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No
Was reporter's transcript requested? No
Name of reporter: Dorothy Snarr
Dated this 1'' day of October, 2007.

V. ELLIOTT LARSEN

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 2

3@

CLYDE G. NELSON
Attorney at Law
172 South Main Street
P.O. Box 797
Soda Springs, I
D 83276
Telephone: (208) 547-2135
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136
Idaho State Bar No. 1197
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DrSTIUCT COURT OF THE SMTH JUDICIAL DlSTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, I N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

1

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE,
COMPANY, an l&ho Corpomtion,
and Scott Becksteed, Individually

1

1
)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

VS.

)
)

CITY OF PRESTON,

CASE NO. CV-2006-390
DEFENDANT'S MEM0RANI)IIM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
AND MEMORANDUM OF
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES

1

. 1

Dtfcndant

The Court issued Summary Judgment in favor of the Defendant and against thc I'laintill'
Plaintiff and Defendant each submitted aMotion for Summary Judgment. The Court considered thc
same after Hearing, and issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant's Motion
for SummaryJudgment and denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and issucd Judgment
on August 16, 2007. On August, 22, 2007, the Defendant submitted its Motion for

C'osts nnd

Attorney Fees and Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees. The Plaintiffsubmitted an Ohjectiol)
to Defendant's Request for Costs and Attorney Fees dated September 6.2007 The court set Noticc
of Hearing on Plaintiffs Requested for Attorney Fees and Costs on September 19. 2007

DEFENDANTS -Bs
MOTION FOR ~ - m A n o

RWQkT(K
cdstg

1

The relevant portions of applicable Statutes or Rules are set forth as follows:

$12-117, Idaho Code
12-117 ATTORNEY'S FEES, WITNESS FEES AND EXPENSES
AWARDED IN CERTAIN INSTANCES.
(1) Uilless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or
civil judicial proceeding involving'as adverse parties a state agency,
a city, a coullty or other taxing district aud a person, the court shall
award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and
reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the
judgmeilt is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.

312-120, Idaho Code
12-120 ATTORNEY'S FEES IN CIVIL ACTIONS.

(1) Except as provided in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, in
any action where the amouilt pleaded is Twenty-five Thousa~d
dollars ($25,000) or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the
prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasollable
amount to be fixed by the court as attorney's fees.
$12-121. Idaho Code
12-121 ATTORNEY'S FEES.
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to
the prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not
alter, repeal or amend any statute which otherwise provides for the
award of attorney's fees. The term "party" or "parties" is defined to
include any person, partnership, corporation, association, private
organization, the state of Idaho or political subdivisioil thereof.

Rule 54(d)(l). Costs - Items allowed.

(A) Parties Entitled to Costs. Except when othe;wise limited by these
rules, costs shall be allowed as amatter of right to the prevailiilg party
or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
(B) Prevailing Party. In determilling which party to an action is a
prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its s o u ~ d
discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in
relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court
in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an actioll

UEFEKDANT'S \IE\IOR.\KDIIlI I N SUPPOIIF OF
\IOTION FOR -\ITOIINEY FEES ,\YO COSTS
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prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may
apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and
equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims
involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments
obtained.
Rule 54(d)(5). Memorandum of costs.
At any time after the verdict of a jury or a decision of the court, any
party who claims costs may file and serve on adverse parties a
memorandum of costs, itemizing each claimed expense, but such
memorandum of costs may not be filed later tlxan fourteen (14) days
after entry ofjudgment. Suchmemorandum~nuststatethat to the best
of the party's knowledge and belief the items are correct and that the
costs claiilled are in compliance with this ~ule.Failure to file such
memorandum of costs within the period prescribed by this rule shall
be a waiver of the right of costs. A memorandum of costs prematurely
filed shall be considered as timely.

Rule 54(e)(l). Attorney fees.
In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees,
which at the discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the
prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when
provided for by any statute or contract. Provided, attorney fees under
section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the court only when
it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought,
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasol~ablyor without foundation;
but attorney fees shall not be awarded pursuant to section 12-121,
Idaho Code, on a default judgment.
Rule 54(e)(4). Pleading -- Default Judgments.
It shall not be necessary for anyparty in a civil action to assert a claim
for attornev fees in any pleading; provided, however, attorney fees,
when claimed to be allowable by contract or statute other than section
12-121, Idaho Code, shall not be awarded unless the prayer for relief
in the complaint states that the party is seeking attorney fees and the
dollar amount thereof in case judgment is entered by default. Any
award of attorney fees in default judgments shall be subject to the
other provisions of this Rule 54(e), and shall not exceed the amount
prayed for in the complaint. Any award of attorney fees pursuant to
LC. Section 12-120, in default judglilents in which the defendant has
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not appeared shall not exceed the anlount of the judgment for the
claim, exclusive of costs.

Rule 54(e)(5). Attorney fees as costs.
Attorney fees, when allowable by statute or contract, shall be deemed
as costs in an action and processed in the sane manner as costs and
included in the memorandum of costs; provided, however, the claim
for attorney fees as costs shall be supported by an affidavit of the
attorney stating the basis and method of computation of the attorney
fees clain~ed.

Rule 68. Offer of Judgment.
(a) At any time more than 14 days before the trial begins, a party
defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer
to allow judgment to be taken against the defending party for the
money or property or to the effect specified in the offer, which offer
of iudrrment shall be deemed to include all claims recoverable,
including any attorneys fees awardable under Rule 54(e)(l), and any
costs awardable under Rule 54(d)(l),
. . . . which have accrued up to the
date of the offer ofjudgment.
4

-

Rule 68(b)(l).
If the adjusted award obtained by the offeree is less than the offer,
then:
(i) the offeree must pay those costs of the offeror as allowed under
Rule 54(d)(l), incurred after the making of the offer;
After a comparison of the offer and the adjusted award, in appropriate
cases, the district court shall order an amount which either the offeror
or the offeree must ultimately pay separate and apart from the amount
owed under the verdict. A total judgment sl~aIl.beentered taking into
account both the verdict and the involved costs.

Authority Citation
In its Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint, the Defendant requested that Plaintiff's clainl be
dismissed and that Defendant recover fiorn Plaintiff its attorney fees and costs pursuant to $12-117,
12-120, and 12-121, Idaho Code. In its Reply Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for Su~nmary
DEFENDANT'S MEMOMNDIII\? IN SUPPORT OF
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Judgment, Defendant denied that Plaintiff sl~ouldbe awarded attorney fees and requested that
attorney fees be awarded to it. In its Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees, the Defendant requested
attorney fees and costs pursuant to 512-1 17,12-120, and 12-121, Idaho Code as well as pursuant to
Rule 54 and Rule 68, I.R.C.P.
The Plaintiff argues that Defendant is required to have claimed attorney fees and costs in its
Motion for Summary Judgment. Otherwise, the Plaintiff argues, Plaintiff has had no opportunity to
respond. Plaintiff cites no authority for the argument that a request for attorney fees must be
contained in a Motion for Summary Judgment. Rule 54(e)(4) I.R.C.P. specifically states that it is
not necessary for any party in a civil action to assert a claim for attorney fees in any pleading.
Nevertheless, the City has asserted the specific statutes on which it relied as authority for award of
costs and attorney fees in its Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint'a~ldagain has set forth that authority
in its Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. Rule 68 was not asserted in the Answer as an Offer of
Judgment is not to be filed with the Court. Rule 54(c)(5) requires the Memorandum of Costs and
Attorney Fees to be submitted "after the verdict of a jury or a decision of the court". Pursuant to
g12-117, 12-120 and 12-121 as well as Rule 54, attorney fees and costs may be awarded only to the
prevailing party. The prevailing party is not knowil prior to judgment being entered. It would be
premature and presumptuous to argue attorney fees and costs prior to the decision of the court.
Contrary to Plaintiffs assertion, the Plaintiff has the oppollunity to respond to Defenda~t'sRequest
for Attorney Fees and Costs by filing an Objection pursuant to Rule 54(d)(6) and Rule 54(e)(6),
I.R.C.P. Plaintiff has done so, and is now responding to Defendant's request. A hearing is set, and
the Plaintiff will have the opportunity to be heard.
The Plaintiff cites Garner v. Barschi, 139 Idaho 430,438. In that case, following Sunlrnarjr
Judgment in favor

oE Barschi, Barschi submitted a Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees

pursuant to Rule 54. However, Barschi failed to cite 11er authority for attorney fees within its request
either through contract or by statute. The Memorandum was a Request for Attorney Fees and Costs
without any underlying authority for award of the same. The court ruled that as Barschi had neither
cited any provision of the contract or any statute for authority to award attorney fees, and as she had
failed to list the work performed, that tile request should be denied. The Plaintiff also cites MDS
Investments, L.L.C. v. State, 138 Idaho 456,465 and Crea v. FMC Corp., 135 Idaho 175,181 for the
proposition that the specific statute, rule or case authority must be asserted by the prevailing party.
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IN S t

I'l'Ol1r01.

110 l l O U IOII .ATTORNEY I:EES A U D COSIS

5

InMDS the party requesting attorney fees had failed to cite ',any statute, rule or case law supporting
its claim for attorney fees..." 138 Idaho 465. I11 Crea, not only did the claimant fail to assert any
statute as a basis for attorney fees, it failed to request attorney fees in its cost bill and did not file an
affidavit from which the court could establish the basis of an award of attorney fees. The
requirement for the citation of authority for attorney fees and costs is merely to direct the court's
attention to the relevant statute under which the claimant is making claim. The City has done so in
this case, not only in its Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint, but also in its Motion, Affidavit, and
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees. In this case, the Motion is supported by an Affidavit of
counsel and a very specific and detailed Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees.
Nevertheless, the cases cited by Plaintiff have been overruled or seriously co~nproinisedby
the case of Eighteen Mile Ranch, L.L.C. v. NordExcavating & Paving, Inc. 141 Idaho 716,117 P.3d
130 (2005). In that case the Defendant had not asserted its claim for attorney fees in its Answer or
Counterclaim. It first asserted the same in its Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees. The court
quoting Rule 54(e)(4) I.R.C.P. ruled that it is not necessary for a party to list a specific attorney fee
provision in its pleadings in order to obtain a fee award when it is the prevailing party. The court
stated:
Having concluded that the Nords and the Company were prevailing
parties, we must now decide whether they adequately supported their
request for fees. It is well established that "[a] party claiming
attorney's fees must assert the specific statute, rule, or case authority
for its claim." MDS

Invs., Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 456,465,65 P.3d 197,206 (2003). See
also Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 79 P.3d 723 (2003). The
Shelbys contend that the Nords failed to cite a rule, statute, or other
authority in support of their request for fees. The Shelbys are wrong.
In their initial and subsequent fee requests the Nords and the
Company cited LC. $5 12-120, and requested fees "as a matter of
costs because this was a commercial transaction as defined by Idaho
Code $5 12-120." We see nothing defective in this fee request. While
it does not specifically refer to subsection (3) of I.C. $3 12-120, it
adequately identifies the ground under which fees are sought.
The Shelbys contend that a prevailing party may not be awarded
attorney fees unless it has stated in its pleadings the specific code
section upoil which it will rely for a fee award. Such a contention
does find some support in the case law. For example, in Jenkins v.
Donaldson, 91 Idaho 71 1,715,429 P.2d 841,845 (1 967), fees were
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denied for failtire to request the same in a pleading. However, this
result is at odds with Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(4) which states, "It shall
not be necessary for any party in a civil action to assert a claim for
attorney fees in any pleading . . . ." The proviso followiilg this
language is worded somewhat a w k k d l y but it appears the proviso
is intended to set out a different requirement for,judg~llentsby default
-that the fee statute (other than section 12-121) or contract provision
and amount of any fee award sought be specifically stated in the
prayer of the complaint as a preconditioll to obtaining fees in a
judgment by default. Rule 54(e)(4) did not exist at the time Jenkiizs
was decided. It did not become effective until March 1, 1979. By
virtue ofthe adoption of Rule 54(e)(4), the Jenkins holding has been
superseded and has no further validity. Thus, a party need not have
listed a specific attorney fee provision in its pleading in order to
obtain a fee award under that provisioxi upon prevailing in the
litigation. While it is obviously the better practice to specify the fee
request in the pleading, both to preserve a claim for fees in the event
of a default and to put the opposing party on notice of the fee claim,
failure to do so is not fatal to a fee claim in a contested matter. And,
of course, a party must specify, in its Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(5) fee
request, the code section or contract provisioil pursuant to which it
makes the fee request. I-Iere, the Nords and Nord Excavating did so
in their initial memorandum of costs and attorney fees, citing tile
commercial transaction ground, which is set forth in subsection (3) of
I.C. $5 12-120. They are not prevented from seelcing an award just
because their answer or coullterclail~ldid not specifically designate
this provision. (pp. 720-721) See also n i t i s v. Liddle & Moeller
Const., Inc. 2007 Idaho (32089)

prevail in^ Party

Rule 54(d)(l)B states that to determine tlle prevailing party, tlie court should consider the
final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The
Plaintiff sought recovery for a sum in excess of $13,000.00 plus his attorney fees. The Defendailt
denied that it had any liability or responsibilityto tile Plaintiff. The Court ruled that the Plaintiff had
failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the Ordinance prior to colnme~lcingconstruction,
and also failed to timely file its Notice of Claim within the 180 day time period. Judgment was
granted in favor of the Defendant, and Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was denied.
Therefore, the Defendant avoided all liability, and ithe Plaintiff received nothing from his Complaint.
The Defendant is the prevailing party.
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
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In Eighteen Mile Ranch, supra the district court ruled in favor of the defendants aud denied
any recovery to plaintiff. The court only awarded a slllall sum to defendant Nord on its
counterclaim. The district court ruled that neither party had prevailed, taking into consideration
Nord's small recovery on its counterclaim. The Supreme Court reversed finding that Nord was the
prevailing party in that it had avoided all liability. The court stated:
Viewing its success from an overall standpoint, Nord Excavating was
a prevailing party. In ruling it was not, the district court focused too
much attention on the Company's less than trenlendous success on its
counterclaim and seemingly ignored the fact that the Company
avoided all liability as a defendant. The district court improperly
undervalued the Conlpany's successfbl defense. Avoiding liability is
a significant benefit to a defendant. In baseball, it is said that a walk
is as good as a hit. The latter, of course, is more exciting. In litigation,
avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as winning a nloney
judgment is for a plaintiff. Tlle point is, while a plaintiff with a large
money judgment may be nlore exalted tl~ana defendant who simply
walks out of court no worse for the wear, courts must not ignore the
value of a successful defense. In this case, logic suggests that a
verdict in Nord Excavating's favor and a victory on its counterclaim
(albeit, a relatively small one), by definition, makes it a prevailing
party. 141 Idaho 719

512-120 Idaho Code
$ 12-120(l) provides in any action for less tl~an$25,000.00, "there shall be taxed and allowed

to the prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable anlount to be fixed by the court
as attorney's fees." There is no requirement under $12-120 that the Court find the Plaintiff pursued
the case frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, as set forth in Rule 54(e)(l) I.R.C.P. That
requirement applies only to awards of attorney fees and costs pursuant to $21-121, Idaho Code. The
provisions of this Section are mandatory (See Eighteen Mile Ranch, L.L.C., supra, where the court
ruled that a Defendant who avoided liability was the prevailing party and entitled to attorney fees
pursuant to $12-120, Idaho Code.) See also Fritts v. Liddle & Moeller, supra.
812-117, Idaho Code

The provisions of § 12-1 17require the court to award the prevailing party reasonable attorney
fees and costs if the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis

in fact or law. While the provisions of $12-120, Idaho Code, slzodd izzandate tlze award of attorney
fees, the court may also rely upon $12-117 in this award. The only question that tlze court has to
determine under this Section is wlzether the Plaintiff acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
The provisions of the ordinance upon wlzich the Plaintiff relied were explicit. The Plaiiztiff
had to make a request to the City that it wished to be reimbursed for its coltstructioizcosts. Tlze sane
would be submitted to the City, aizd tlze City would cause competitive bids to be obtained. The
Plaintiff never nzade the City aware of his request that he wanted to be reimbursed, altlzough fully
aware of his costs at the time of construction. The Plaintiff waited one year before he even notified
the City through his letter of October, 2004, that he wanted to meet with the City to discuss
reimbursement. Thus, the court ruled that t11e Plaintiff had failed to conzply wit11 tlze provisions of
the Ordinance, aizd had further failed to conzply with the Notice of Claim provisions. Plaintiff was
fully aware that it had not complied with the Ordinance or the Notice of Claim provisions in tlzat
Plaintiffs attorney submitted a Notice of Claim in 2006, nearly tluee years later. There was no
reasonable basis of fact or law upon which the Plaintiff could rely in bringing its claim. Thus, the
Defendant is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs based upon $12-1 17, Idalzo Code.

s12-121. Idaho Code.
$12-121 allows an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party. This code section is
limited by Rule 54(e)(l) wlzich requires the court to determine whether the Plaintiff brouglzt or
pursued its claim frivolously, u~ueasonably,or witl~outfoundation. For the reasons set fort11 in
argument for award of attorney's fees under 5 12-1 17, tlze Defendant would contend that Plaintiffs
claim was frivolous and without foundation. Failure to colnply with tlze Ordinance, and failure to
timely file a Notice of Claim, prevented tlze Plaintiff from proceeding with his action. To have
pursued it, regardless of tlze Ordinance or failure to timely file Notice of Claim, is frivolous aizd
unreasonable.
Rule 68 I.R.C.P.
As set fortlz in Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs aizd the accompa~zying
Affidavit aizd attachments thereto, tlze Defendant nzade two offers ofjudgment. The first was for
$4,000.00, which was rejected by letter from Mr. Fuller. The second was for $5,000.00 in the nature
of a formal Rule 68 Offer, and no response was made to tlzat offer by Defendaut. The Plaintiff cites
DEFENDANT'S MEWIORANDUM IN SIlPPORT OF
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Ireland v. Ireland, 123 Idaho 955 (1993) as authority for the position that Rule 68 does not allow a

Defendant to recover altorney fees. The Plaintiff also cites the case of Vulkv Haley, 112 Idaho 855
(1987). Both cases were decided under the former Rule 68 which was rescinded in 1997. The new
Rule 68, requires the offeree to pay the costs of the offeror. Further, the Rule goes on to state:
"After a conlparison of the offer and the adjusted award, in
appropriate cases, the district court shall order an amount which
either the offeror of the offeree must ultimately pay separate and apart
from the amount owed under the verdict. A total judg~ne~lt
shall be
entered talcing illto account both the verdict and the iilvolved costs."
Rule 54(e)(5) reads as follows:
"Attorney fees, when allowable by statute or contract, shall be
deemed as costs in an action and processed in the same manner as
costs and included in the Memorandum of Costs; provided, llowever,
the claim for attorney's fees as costs supported by an affidavit of the
attorney stating the basis and method of computation of the attorney
fees claimed."
Thus, attorney fees are treated as costs pursuant to Rule 54. Rule 68 now allows the offeror
to recover its costs where the offeree has rejected the offer. As attorney fees are treated as costs, and
as the Plaintiff rejected the Offer, the Defendant should recover its attorney fees and costs pursuant
to Rule 68.

Amount of Attorney Fees and Costs
The amount of attorney fees and costs claimed by the Defendant are reasonable. PlaintiR
filed three different Complaints in this action. The Defendant filed an Answer to the First Amended
Complaint, and after hearing upon a Motion to Amend, filed an Answer to the Second Anlended
Complaint. There was voluminous discovery done by both the Plaintiff and Defendant in this case.
Response toDiscovery required extensive interview of witnesses and the obtaiuing of docunents to
provide to Plaintiff. Disclosures of Witnesses aild Suppleinental Disclosure were presented.
Motions for Summary Judgment, Responses to those Motions, and several Affidavits were required
in order to properly respond. Hearings were held. The total hours submitted by the Defendant for
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDZIM IN SIJPPORT OF
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by the Plaintiff in pursuing its claim, is not unreasonable. Furthermore, Defendant's counsel billed
the Defendant at the rate of $90.00 per hour, arate much lower than that he charges other clients, and
far below the standard rate charged in the Southeast Idaho area. Defendant's cou~selhas nearly forty
years experience in the practice of law. He has practiced in the Southeast Idaho area for 33 years.
The Defendant has documented the time and labor required as a result of Plaintiffs pursuit of this
action necessary to avoid liability to his client, and obtained the most favorable outcome that could
possibly be achieved. The time and labor involved in the defense of this case is well documented.
The Plaintiff would argue that the Defendant should not recover its attorney fees and costs, as they
are "approximately 213 of the entire unount involved in this clainl." However, the Plaintiff fails to
cite any statute or rule which prohibits the award of attorney fees which may constitute a substantial
sum in relation to the amount claimed by the Plaintiff.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the Rules, Statutes, and case law referred to above, the Defendant is entitled
to an award of attorney fees and costs in the amount claimed plus time required for briefing and
arguing Plaintiffs objections.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served by first
class mail, postage prepaid, by facsimile, or hand delivered on this 4"' day of October, 2007, to
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Steven R. Fuller

[x ] U.S. Mail

Attorney at Law
24 North State St.
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[ ] Hand Delivered

P.O. Box 191
Preston, ID 83263
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL-DIST

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNT/ OF FRANKLIN

SC07T BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff(s),
vs

I
/ MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER
Case No. CV-2006-390

CITY OF PRESTON, a Municrpai
Corporation,

DATE:

October 11, 2007
Steven R. Fuller, Attorney for Plaintiff
Clyde G,Nelson, Attorney for Defendant

APPEARANCES:

MATTER BEFORE THE COURT: Motlon for Costs and Attorney Fees
PROCEEDINGS: At the outset the Court heard oral argument from respective counsel
regarding said motion. The Court: wlll review the briefs submitted and take this matter
under advisement for approximately 30 days.

DATED:

October 11,2007
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DON L. MARDING
Dlstrict Judge
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SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE
COMPANY, An Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff,
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CV-2006-390
)
)
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
)
ORDER DENYING IN PART APJD
)

GRANTING IM PART DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY
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)
VS.

CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal Corporation3

1
Defendant.
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THE MATTER BEFORE THE COURT:
This matter is back before the Court onDefendant's Mooliorafor Costs mdAtrorney Fees.

This case first came before the Court on September 8,2006, when the Plaintiff filed a complaint
against the Defendant seeking reimbursement for work he had performed pursuant to Preston,
Idaho) City Ordinance S;16.28.030('). Both parties moved for Summary Judgment. The Court

granted Defendant's Motionfor Summmy Judgment and entered Judgment on August 16,2007. The
Defendant timely filed the motion at bar and submitted supporting affidavits and briefs on August
24,2007, The Plaintiff filed an Objection to Defendant's motionfor Costs andAttorneys Fees on
September 6,2007. A hearing .was held on October 1I, 2007, at which time the Cout took the
matter under advisement. Ahr reviewing rhe record and the material submitted by the parties the
Court now issues the following Memorandum Decision and Order regarding the costs and attorney
fees,

Beckstead v. Preston Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants Motion for Attorney
fees and Costs
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ISSUES PRESENTED:
1. Is the Defendant entitled to an award of costs7
2, Is the Defendant entitled to an award of attorney fees?

ANALYSIS:
A. The Defendant is Entitled to a ~ a r t i a i ~ w a rofdCOS~B,
Rule 54(d)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in the exercise of its
discretion, the heal court may @anta prevailitlg party certain costs as a matter of right. More
specifically the rule provides that a prevailing party may be awarded the following: 1) court
filing fees, 2) fees for service of documents, 3) fees for expert witnesses 4) reasonable costs of
the preparation of models, maps, pictures, photographs, or other exhibits admitted in evidence, 5)
charges for reporting or transcribing of a deposition, and 6) charges for one copy of any
deposition, Rule 54(d)(l)(C), Furthermore, the determination of who is a prevailing party for
the purposes of this rule is left to the Court's discretion. 54(d)(l)@). The Court is .to determine
who prevails by looking at the find judgment in relation to the relief sought by the respective
parties. Id
The record shows that on August 16,2007 the Conrt entered a judgment in favor of the
Defendant because he escaped FLUliability claimed by Plaintiff. The Defendant is therefore the
prevailing party in this matter and as such, it is proper to a\vard costs as a matter of right.
However, Defendant fails to distinguish between costs claimed as a matter of right and
discretionary costs in his Memorendurn in support ofMotionfor and Memorandurn of Costs and

Attorney Fees. Furthermore, Rule 54(d)(l)(C) does not allow for estimated postage fees therefore
the Court will not award the Defendant the $25.00 in costs which it deems are discretionary,
These discretionary costs are not shown to be necessary or exceptional to this case therefore the

Beclcstead v. Preston Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants Motion for Attorney
fees and Costs
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Court will not award the discretionary costs of $25.00 for estimated postage. Those costs claimed
by Defendant in the August 24,2007 memorandum which are allowable under Rule 54(d)(l) are
as follows:

.. ,
!
Filing Fees for answer to l b e n d e d complaint

i , Filiig Fees for notice of ap earance
ii.
Total of Costs as a Matter of Right.

$58.00
$14.00
$72.00

These costs qualify as costs as a matter of right under Rule 54(d)(l) and Plaintiff does not
object to them, thus the Court will award them.

B. The Defendant is Not Entitled to an Award of Attorneys Fees.
Defendant claims attorney fees in the amount of $7,717.50 under LC. $5 12.117, 12-120,
12-121 and under 1,R.C.P. 68 and 54(e)(l). The Court will address each application of the
statutes and rules to the facts ofthis case.
LC. @ 12-117 provides for an award of attorney fees and costs in which a municipality is
involved as long as the person against whom judgment was rendered acted without a reasonable
basis in faot or law. LC, 5 12.1 17(2). The Court is left to determine whether a party acted with or
without a reasonable basis of law or fact, LC, 8 12-117(1).
The Court cannot in good conscious declare that Plaintiff acted without a reasonable
basis of fact or law in this case. The root ofthe matter involves a city ordinance which was
subject to differing interpretations. Varying interpre'tationsprovide a reasonable basis in law on
which the case was brought, The facts of the case provided a reasonable basis for the
interpretations because Plaintiff had performed the work and he felt he was entitled to
reimbursement under his interpretation of the city ordinance. A reasonable person may well
interpret the City ordinance in the same manner as the Plaintiff had.

Beckstead v. Preston Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants Motion for Attorney
fees and Costs
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The allegation by Defendant that this case was pursued frivolously fails because the City
ordinance could have been interpreted either way. It may be the very ambiguous nature of the
ordinance which has caused the City to repeal it. A review of the facts of this case shows tbat
Mr. Beckstead had conversed with one of the City's engineers who advised him ofthis
ordinance. Mr. Beckstead could have reasonably relied on this information in pursing this matter.

Mr. Beckstead argued that any toliing of time restrictions should not commence until he sent a
letter on October 22,2004. While this argument did not convince the Court that the time
limitations for filing a claim against b e City should begin tolling from this date, this argument
does provide a reasonable basis on which to pursue the claim legally. This was not an unfounded
claim.
Next the Court looks at an application of I.C. 12-121 and Rule 54(e)(l) to this case.
These rules provide that a court may properly award attorney fees to a prevailing party if the
Court determines that the opposing party brought, pursued, or defended& action frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation. Rule 54(e)(l).An award of attorney fees must also be
accompanied with factual findings providing a basis and reason fot the award, Rule 54(e)(Z).
Where the record and arguments do not lead to the conclusion that the action was brought,
pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation attorney fees are
inappropriate, Tirtsdalc v. I'insdale, 127 Idaho 331 (Ct, AppJ995). Finally, the decision to award
attorney fees rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Caldwell v, Idaho Youth Raoch,
132 Idaho 120,986 P.2d 215 (1998).

The Court does not feel that there is afactual basis upon which to base an award. As
discussed above, the case was not brought frivolously, nor does the record indicate that the case

Beckstead v. Preston Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants Motion for Attorney
fees and Costs
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was pursued unreasonably or without foundation. The Plaintiff based his claims on facts which
he considered wouid help him prevail in the matter.
Defendant has claimed attorney fees under Rule 68 which, "includes all claims
recoverable, including any attorneys fees awardable under Rule 54(e)(l)." See I.R.C.P. 68. As
stated above this Court has determined that no attorney fees are to be awarded under Rule
54(e)(l) because the action was not pursued frivoIously. The Court awarded costs as a matter of
right in the amount of $72.00 which is also allowed for under this rule in conjunction with Rule

54(d)(l). However, because an award of attorneys fees under Rule 68 relies upon Rule 54(e)(l)
the Court cannot award attorneys fees utilizing this rule as it would conflict with the Courts
decision as to whether the oase was pursued frivolously.
As stated above the Court deems that there was a reasonable basis in law and fact for this
case to be brought and pursued. In accordance with that determination the Court can conclude
that this action was not brought or pursued fiivotously. Therefore under the same rationale the
Court is not going to award attorneys fees.
Plaintiff claims that because the claims were specified in its' pleadings Defendant should
not be awarded attomey fees, The Plaintiff cites oase law famigar to this Court in support of his
argument that attorneys fees must be based on a statute or contract in order for an award to be
made. Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430 (2004). This case is distinguishable from Bartschi, in
that case there was no basis on statute put forth upon which a claim of attorney fees could be
based until Ms. Bartschi filed a supplemental petition pursing attorney fees based on LC, 12121. The Court considered the supplemented statute as a basis after the filing was made, proving
that when a statute is cited it will be considered. In this instance the petitioner has cited several
statutes as well as rules as a basis for their claim to attorney fees.

Beckstead v. Preston Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants Motion for Attorney
fees and Costs
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While it is obviously the better practice to speccy the attorney fees request in the
pleading, both to preserve a claim for fees and to put the opposing side on notice of the fee
claim, failure to do so is not fatal to a fee claim in a contested matter. Eighteen Mile Ranch v.
Nord Excavating, 141 Idaho 716 (2005). Furthermore, in this case the Defendant did assert a

claim for attorney fees in its Answe~to Plaintcs Complaint as well as in its Motion for Attorney
Fees and Costs. The Court finds that this is sufficient notice of the claims for attorney fees and

costs. However, because the Court believes the Plaintiffs acted in good faith in bringing and
pursuing their claim no attorney fees will be awarded and each party shall bear their own costs.
The Court is denying attorney fees as a result of the determination that the claim was not
unfounded and not because Defendant failed to request them properly.

CONCLUSION:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED that based upon the above

reasoning and the facts and reasoning contained in the Court's August 16,2007 Memorandum
Decision and Order that the Plaintiff shall pay the amount of $72.00 as costs as a matter of right.
No award of attorney fees to either party is granted.

s@day of Octobefl007
Dated this $

LR, 2
.
w

Don L. Hardhe:District Judge
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document on the anorney(s) or person(s) listed below inihe manner indicated.
Method of Service:
Steven R. Fuller
Steven R. Fuller Law Off~ce
24 North State
Post Office Box 191
Preston, Idaho 83263
Telephone: (208) 852-2680
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683

[ ] U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivered

Clyde G. Nelson
City of Preston
Attorney at Law
172 South Main Street
Post Office Box 797
Soda Springs, Idaho 83276
Telephone: (208) 547-2135
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136

[ ] U.S.MailPostage Prepaid
OvemightMail
Facsiie
Hand Delivered

DATED this

of October, 2007.

V. ELLIOT LARliEN
Clerk of the District Court
By:
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IN THE DISTNCT COURT OF THE SIXTH Jhn)l[CIAL DISTRICT OF THE

.'M~WT

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRAMKLIN

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE

COMPANY, An Idaho Corporation,

1
)

Case No.

1
1

Plaintiff,

CV-2006+390

AMENDED JUDGMENT

)

1
1
1
1

VS.

CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal
Corporation,

)

1
1

Defendant.

ZT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED pursuant to this
Court's Memorandum Decision and Order in this case, dated August 16,2007, and this
Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Denying in Pard and Granting in Parr

Defendant's Motionfor Costs and Attorney dated October 25'h 2007, the Court hereby
enters judgment in favor of Defendant and awards them cost8 of %72,00.The Court
further orders that each party bear their own attorney fws.
IT IS SO ORDERED,
DATED this &?!ay

pr,

of October, 2007.
DON L,HARDING
District Judge
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTFY that on the date below, I served atme and correct copy of the
foregoing docuntent on the attomey(s) or pr?rson(s) listed below in the manner indicated.
Attomey(s)/Persons(s):

Method of Service:

Clyde G. Nelson

[ ] U.S. MailPostage Prepaid
[ .] Overnight Mail
&f Facsimile
[ 1 Hand Delivered
[ ] COWBOX

City of Preston
Attorney at Law

172 South Main Street
Post Office Box 797
Soda Springs, Idaho 83276
Telephone: (208) 547-2135
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136

[ ] U.S. MailPostage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail

Steven R. Fuller
STEVEN R. FULLER LAW OFFICE
24 North State
Post Offrce Box 191
Preston, Idaho 83263
Telephone: (208) 852-2680
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683

DATED this

[a Facsimile

[ ) Hand Delivered
[ ] Court Box

30day of October, 2007.
V, ELLIOTT LARSEN
Clerk of the District Court

By:
Deputy Clerk

CLYDE G. NELSON
Preston City Attorney
172 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 797
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Telephone: (208) 547-2135
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136
Idaho State Bar No. 1197
Attorney for Defenda~ltlResponde~IliCross-Appellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLlN
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE,
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,
and SCOTT BECKSTEAD, Individually,

1

1
PlaintiffsIAppellantsiCross-Respondents

CASE NO. CV-2006-390

)

1
VS.

)

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL

1
CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal Corporation,

)

Defe~~dantiRespondentiCross-Appellant )
TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED CROSS-RESPONDENTS, SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL
ESTATE COMPANY, AN IDAHO CORPORATZ'ON, AND SCOTT BECKSTEAD,
INDIVIDUALLY, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, STEVEN R. FULLER, 24
NORTEI STATE STREET, P.O. BOX 191, PRESTON, IDAHO 83263 AND THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
Notice is hereby given that:
1.

m.The above named Cross-Appellant, the City of Preston, Idaho, appeals

against the above named Cross-Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memoratldu~ll

CROSS-APPEAL
BECKSTEAD V. CITY OF PRESTON

Decision and Order Denying in Part and Graltilting in Part Defeiidant's Motion for Costs and
Attorney Fees entered in the above entitled action on the 25'h day of October, 2007, and the
Amended Judgment denying the Cross-Appellant it's attorney fees in this action dated October
30,2007, the Honorable Don L. Harding, District Judge, presiding.
2.

Right to Cross-Anneal That the City of Preston, Idaho has a right to cross-appeal

to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Order and Amended Judgment described in Paragraph 1
above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 1l(a)(1)(7) I.A.R. and Rule 15(b) I.A.R.
3.

Preliminary Statement of Issues 011 Appeal.

'

(a) Whether the Cross-Appellant should have been awarded attorney fees
pursuant to its Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees and Memorandum of Costs and Attorney
Fees.
(b) Whether the District court improperly denied the award of attorney
fees to Cross-Appellant.
4.

Is a Reporter's Transcript Reauested? No.

5.

Clerk's Record. The Cross-Appellant requests that the following docunents be

included in the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28,IA.R.
and those designated by the Appellant in the initial Notice of Appeal:
(a) Cross-Appellant's Motioll for Costs and Attoriley Fees, Affidavit of Clyde
G. Nelson in Support of said Motion, Memorandun of Costs and Attorney Fees, all briefs or

memora~dumssubmitted to the court in support or opposition to said Motion and Memorandum,
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying in Part and Granting in Part Defendant's Motion for
Costs and Attorney Fees dated October 25,2007, and Amended Judgment dated October 30,
2007.

CROSS-APPEAL
BECKSTEAD V. CITY OF PRESTON

6.

Service. I certify:
(a) That a copy of the Cross-Appeal and any request for additional clerk's

record have been served on the Clerk of the District Court.
(b) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee
for preparation of the Clerk's Record of any additional documents requested on Cross-Appeal.
(c) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuait to Rule 20 I.A.R.
DATED this 2"d day of November, 2007

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CROSSAPPEAL was served on the 2"dday of November, 2007.
On:

By:

Clerk of the District Court
Franklin Coui~ty
39 West Oneida
Preston, ID 83263

[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Facsimile
[ x ] Hand Delivered

Steven R. Fuller
Attorney at Law
24 North State
P.O. Box 191
Preston. ID 83263

[ x ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivered
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT'OF

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR.THE COUNTY OF

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, and
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, individually,
Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Respondents,

Supreme Court No.

/

CLERKS CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL

I

VS.

AMENDED
NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL

CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal
Corporation,
Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant.
Appeal from:

Sixth Judicial District, Franklin County
Honorable Don L. Harding

Case number from court: CV-06-390
Order or judgment appealed from:

Attorney for Appellant:

Memorandum Decision and Order Denying
in Part and Granting in Part Defendant's Motion for
Costs and Attorney Fees and Amended Judgment

Steven R. Fuller
Steven R. Fuller Law Office
PO Box 191
Preston, ID 83263

Attorney for Respondent: Clyde G. Nelson
Attorney at Law
PO Box 797
Soda Springs, ID 83276

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 1

,

<

,:l.Ej:K

Appeal by: Plaintiffs
Appeal against: Defendants
Notice of Appeal filed: September 25, 2007
Notice of Cross Appeal filed: November 2,2007
Appellate fee paid: Yes
Request for additional (clerk's) record filed: No
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No
Was reporter's transcript requested? No
Name of reporter: Dorothy Snarr
Dated this gth day of November, 2007.

V. ELLIOTT LARSEN

BY

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE
COMPANY, An Idaho Corporation,

)
) Case No.

CV-2006-390

1

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING IN PART AND
)
GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S
VS.
) MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY
)
FEES
CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal Corporation,)
)

Plaintiff,

1

Defendailt.

)
)

THE MATTER BEFORF: THE COURT:
This matter is baclc before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attoiney Fees
This case first came before the Court 011 September 8,2006, when the Plaintiff filed a co~nplaint
against the Defendant seeking rei~nbursemelltfor worlc he had performed pursuant to Preston,
Idaho, City Ordinance $16.28.030(B). Both parties moved for S m i u y Judgment. The Cout
granted Defendant's Motion for Sunzmary Judgment and entered Judgment on August 16,2007. The
Defendant timely filed the motion at bar and submitted supporting affidavits and briefs on August
24, 2007. The Plaintiff filed an Objection to Defendant's motion for Costs andAttorrzeys Fees on
September 6,2007. A hearing was held on October 11,2007, at which time the Court took the
matter under advisement. After reviewing the record and the material submitted by the parties the
Court now issues the following Memoranduni Decision and Order regarding the costs and attorney
fees.

Beckstead v. Presto11Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants Motion for Attorney
fees and Costs
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ISSUES PRESENTED:
1. Is the Defendant entitled to an award of costs?
2. Is the Defendant entitled to an award dattorney fees?

ANALYSIS:
A. The Defendant is Entitled to a Partial Award of Costs.
Rule 54(d)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in the exercise of its
discretion, the trial court may grant a prevailing party certain costs as a matter of right. More
specifically the rule provides that a prevailing party may be awarded the following: 1) court
filing fees, 2) fees for service of documents, 3) fees for expert witnesses 4) reasonable costs of
the preparation of models, maps, pictures, photographs, or other exhibits admitted in evidence, 5)
charges for reporting or transcribing of a deposition, and 6) charges for one copy of any
deposition. Rule 54(d)(l)(C). Furthermore, the determillation of who is a prevailing party for
the purposes of this rule is left to the Court's discretion. 54(d)(l)(B). The Court is to determine
who prevails by looking at the final judgment i11relation to the relief sought by the respective
parties. Id.
The record shows that 011August 16,2007 the Court entered a judglnent in favor of the
Defendant because he escaped all liability claimed by Plaintiff. The Defendant is therefore the
prevailing party in this matter and as such, it is proper to award costs as a matter of right.
However, Defendant fails to distinguish between costs claimed as a matter of right and
discretionary costs in his Memorandum in support of Motioi?for and Memorandum ofcosts and

Attorney Fees. Furthermore, Rule 54(d)(l)(C) does not allow for estimated postage fees therefore
the Court will not award the Defendant the $25.00 $costs which it deems are discretionary.
These discretionary costs are not shown to be necessary or exceptional to this case therefore the

Becltstead v. Preston Mernoraildu~nDecision and Order on Defendants Motion for Attorney
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Court will not award the discretionary costs of $25.00 for estimated postage. Those costs claimed
by Defendant in the August 24, 2007 memorandum which are allowable under Rule 54(d)(l) are
as follows:
i. Filing Fees for notice of appearance .
ii. Filing Fees for answer to 1'' amended co~nplaint
Total of Costs as a Matter of Right.

$58.00
$14.00
$72.00

These costs qualify as costs as a matter of right under Rule 54(d)(l) and Plaintiff does not
object to them, thus the Court will award them.

B. The Defendant is Not Entitled to an Award of Attorneys Fees.
Defendant claims attorney fees in the aniou~itof $7,717.50 uider I.C.

$5 12-1 17, 12-120:

12-121 and under I.R.C.P. 68 and 54(e)(l). The Court will address each application of the
statutes and rules to the facts of this case.
I.C. $ 12-1 17 provides for an award of attorney fees and costs in which a mu~iicipalityis
involved as long as the person against whom judgment was rendered acted without a reasonable
basis in fact or law. I.C. $ 12-1 17(2). The Court is left to determine whether a party acted with or
without a reasonable basis of law or fact. I.C.

5

12-1 17(1).

The Court cannot in good conscious declare that Plaintiff acted without a reasonable
basis of fact or law in this case. The root of the lilatter involves a city ordinance which was
subject to differing interpretations. Varying interpretations provide a reasonable basis in law 017
which the case was brougl~t.The facts of the case provided a reasonable basis for the
interpretations because Plaintiff had performed the work and he felt he was entitled to
reimbursement under his interpretation of the city ordinance. A reasonable person niay well
interpret the City ordinance in the same manner as the Plaintiff had.

Beckstead v. Preston Memorandum Decisio~iand Order on Defendants Motion for ~ t t o r ~ i e y
fees and Costs
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The allegation by Defendant that this case was pursued frivolously fails because the City
ordinance could have been interpreted either way. It may be the very ambiguous nature of the
ordinance which has caused the City to repeal it. A review of the facts of this case shows that
Mr. Beckstead had conversed with one of the City's engineers who advised him of this
ordinance. Mr. Beckstead could have reasonably relied on this information in pursing this matter
Mr. Beckstead argued that any tolling of time restrictions should not commence until he sent a
letter on October 22, 2004. While this argument did not convince the Court that the time
limitations for filing a claim against the City should begin tolling from this date, this argument
does provide a reasonable basis on which to pursue the claim legally. This was not an unfounded
claim.
Next the Court looks at an application of I.C.

9 12-121 and Rule 54(e)(l) to this case.

These rules provide that a court may properly award attorney fees to a prevailing party if the
Court determines that the opposing party brought, pursued, or defended the action frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation. Rule 54(e)(l). An award of attorney fees must also be
accompanied with factual findings providing a basis and reason for the award. Rule 54(e)(2).
Where the record and argume~ltsdo not lead to the conclusion that the action was brought,
pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation attorney fees are
inappropriate. Tinsdale v. Tinsdale, 127 Idaho 331 (Ct. App.1995). Finally, the decision to award
attorney fees rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Caldwell v. Idaho Youth Ranch,
132 Idaho 120,986 P.2d 215 (1998).
The C o u ~does
t
not feel that there is a factual basis upon which to base an award. As
discussed above, the case was not brought fiivolously, nor does the record indicate that the case
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was pursued uilreasonably or without foundation. The Plaintiff based his claims on facts which
he considered would help him prevail in the matter.
Defendant has claimed attorney fees under Rule 68 which, "includes all claims
recoverable, including any attorneys fees awardable under Rule 54(e)(l)." See I.R.C.P. 68. As
stated above this Court has determined that no attorney fees are to be awarded ~ulderRule
54(e)(l) because the action was not pursued frivolously. The Court awarded costs as a matter of
right in the amount of $72.00 which is also allowed for under this rule in conjunction wit11 Rule
54(d)(l). However, because an award of attorneys fees w d e r Rule 68 relies upon Rule 54(e)(l)
the Court cannot award attorneys fees utilizing this rule as it would conflict with the Courts
decision as to whether the case was pursued frivolously.
As stated above the Court deems that there was a reasonable basis in law and fact for this
case to be brought and pursued. In accordance with that determination the Court call conclude
that this action was not brought or pursued frivolously. Therefore under the same rationale the
Court is not going to award attorneys fees.
Plaintiff claims that because the claims were specified'in its' pleadings Defendaut sl~ould
not be awarded attorney fees. The Plaintiff cites case law familiar to this Court in suppo~tof his
argument that attorneys fees must be based on a statute or contract in order for ail award to be
made. Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430 (2004). This case is distinguishable from Bartschi, in
that case there was no basis on statute put forth upon which a claim of attorney fees could be
based until Ms. Baifschi filed a supplemental petition pursing attorney fees based on I.C.

5 12-

12 1. The Court considered the supplemented statute as a basis after the filing was made, proving
that when a statute is cited it will be considered. In this instance the petitioner has cited several
statutes as well as rules as a basis for their claim to attorney fees.

Beckstead v. Preston Memorandum Decision and Order ol1'Defendants Motion for Attorney
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While it is obviously the better practice to specify the attorney fees request in the
pleading, both to preserve a claim for fees and to put the opposing side on notice of the fee
claim, failure to do so is not fatal to a fee claim in a contested matter. Eighleen Mile Ranch

IJ

Nord Excavating, 141 Idaho 716 (2005). Furthermore, in this case the Defendant did assert a
claim for attorney fees in its Answer lo P1aintiJ"'s

Complairzt as well as in its Mofiorz f o ~Atforney

Fees and Costs. The Court finds that this is sufficient notice of the clain~sfor attorney fees and
costs. However, because the Court believes the Plailltiffs acted in good faith in bringing and
pursuing their claim no attorney Cees will be awarded and each party shall bear their own costs.
The Court is denying attorney fees as a result of the determination that the claim was not
unfounded and not because Defendant failed to request them properly.

CONCLUSION:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED that based upon the above
reasoning and the facts and reasoning contained in the Court's August 16,2007 Melnorandum
Decision and Order that the Plaintiff shall pay the amount of $72.00 as costs as a 111atter of right
No award of attorney fees to either p&y is granted.

fi

Dated this g a y of October/2007

a

Don L. Harding
District Judge

-

d
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document on the attorney(s) or person(s) listed below iir the manner indicated.
Attomey(s)/Persons(s):

Method of Service:

Steven R. Fuller
Steven R. Fuller Law Office
24 North State
Post Office Box 191
Preston, Idaho 83263
Telephone: (208) 852-2680
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683

[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

Clyde G. Nelson
City of Preston
Attorney at Law
172 South Main Street
Post Office Box 797
Soda Springs, Idaho 83276
Telephone: (208) 547-2 135
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136

[
[
[
[

] U.S. MaillPostage Prepaid
] Overniglrt Mail
] Facsimile
] Hand Delivered

DATED this

U.S. MailPostage Prepaid
Overniglrt Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivered
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Clerk of the District Court
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE
COMPANY, An Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff,

CaseNo.

1
1
1

.

CV-2006-390

AMENDED JUDGMENT

f
VS.

)

CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal

1

1

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED pursuant to this
Court's Memorandunz Decision and Order in this case, dated August 16, 2007, and this
Court's Memorandunz Decision and Order Denying in Part and Granting in Part

Defendant's Motionfor Costs and Attorney dated October 25'" 2007, the Court hereby
enters judgment in favor of Defendant and awards them costs of $72.00. The Court
further orders that each party bear their o w l attorney fees.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
r/,

DATED this x q a y of October, 2007.
DON L. HARDING
District Judge
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that 011 the date below, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing documeilt on the attorney(s) or person(s) listed below in the manner indicated.
Method of Service:
Clyde G. Nelson
City of Presto11
Attorney at Law
172 So~itiiMain Street
Post Office Box 797
Soda Springs, Idaho 83276
Telephoile: (208) 547-2 135
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136

[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]

Steven R. Fuller
STEVEN R. FULLER LAW OFFICE
24 North State
Post Office Box 191
Preston, Idaho 83263
Telephone: (208) 852-2680
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683

[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

U.S. MailRostage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Haid Delivered
Court Box

U.S. MailPostage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivered
] Court Box

DATED this ___ day of October, 2007.

V. ELLIOTT LARSEN
Clerk of the District Cou-t
By:
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SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, and
S C O T BECKSTEAD, individually,
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Sixth Judicial District, Franklin County
Honorable Don L. Harding

Case number from court: CV-06-390
Order or judgment appealed from:
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Memorandum Decision and Order Denying
in Part and Granting in Part Defendant's Motion for
Costs and Attorney Fees and Amended Judgment

Steven R. Fuller
Steven R. Fuller Law Office
PO Box 191
Preston, ID 83263
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Appeal by: Plaintiffs
Appeal against: Defendants
Notice of Appeal filed: September 25, 2007
Notice of Cross Appeal filed: November 2 , 2007
Appellate fee paid: Yes
Request for additional (clerk's) record filed: No
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No
Was reporter's transcript requested? NO
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Steven R. Fuller Law Office
24 North State
P.O. Box 191
Preston, ID 83263
Telephone: (208) 852-2680
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE
COMPANY, an ldaho Corporation, and
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, individually,

CASE NO. CV-06-390

AMENDED
NOTICE OF APPEAL
ClTY OF PRESTON, a Municipal
Corporation,

TO:

THE ClTY OF PRESTON AND ITS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, CLYDE G.
NELSON AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
Notice is hereby given that:

1.

A

The above-named Appellants, Scott Beckstead Real Estate

Company, an ldaho Corporation, and Scott Beckstead, individually, appeal against the
above-named Respondent, City of Preston, a Municipal Corporation, to the ldaho
Supreme Court from the final Judgment entered in the above-entitled action on the 16'h
day of August, 2007, the Honorable Don L. Harding, presiding.
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2.

Riaht to Appeal. The Appellants have a right to appeal to the ldaho

Supreme Court, and the Judgment or Order described in paragraph I above is an
appealable judgment and order under and pursuant to Rule I l(a)(l), I.A.R.
3.

Preliminary Statement of Issues on Appeal. (I) Whether or not the

Appellants complied with the requirements of Preston City Ordinance 16.28.030(B). (2)
Whether or not Appellants filed a timely claim under the ldaho Tort Claims Act.
4.

Is a Reporter's Transcript Reauested?

No.

5.

Clerk's Record. The Appellants request that the following documents to

be included in the Clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule

28, I.A.R.

(a)

Second Amended Complaint dated May 2, 2007 with attachments;

(b)

Answer to Second Amended Complaint dated May 21, 2007 with

attachments;
(c)

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment dated June 21, 2007;

(d)

Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

dated June 21, 2007 with attachments;
(e)

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment dated June 21,2007;
(f)

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated June 20, 2007:

(g)

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment dated June 20,2007.
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(h)

The following Exhibits to the Memorandum in Support of

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment;

(1) Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen in Support of Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment dated June 19, 2007 and all exhibits attached
to said Affidavit to

include'^-I through K.

(2) Affidavit of Clyde G. Nelson in Support of Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment dated June 19, 2007 together with all
exhibits attached thereto from A - I through C-3.
(3) Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn in Support of Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment dated June 19, 2007;and all exhibits attached
thereto including A through B-2.
(4) Affidavit of John Balls in Support of Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment dated June 19,2007.
(i)

Defendant's Reply Memorandum to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment dated July 23, 2007, which includes the Second Affidavit of
Darrell Wilburn in Support of Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment dated July 20, 2007; and further includes the
Supplementary Affidavit of Clyde G. Nelson in Support of Defendant's
Reply to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment dated July 23, 2007.

(j)

Second Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen in Response to Plaintiff's Reply

toDefendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated July 25, 2007.
(k)

Third Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn in Response to Plaintiff's Reply to

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated July 25, 2007.
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(I)

Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment dated July 23, 2007.
(m)

Beckstead's Second Affidavit in Response to Defendant's Motion

for Summary Judgment dated July 24, 2007 with attachments;
(n)

Beckstead's Third Affidavit in Response to Defendant's Reply to

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment dated July 26, 2007 with
attachments;
(0)

Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment and denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment dated August 16,2007;
(p)

Judgment dated August 16, 2007;

(q)

Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees dated August 22,

2007.
(r)

Affidavit of Clyde G. Nelson in Support of Defendant's Motion for

Costs and Attorney Fees dated August 22, 2007.
(s)

All attachments to Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees

which includes a letter from Clyde G. Nelson to Steven R. Fuller dated
February 13, 2007 (Exhibit A-I - A-2); a letter to Clyde G. Nelson from
Steven R. Fuller dated February 15, 2007 (Exhibit B); and a fax and Offer
of Judgment dated February 16,2007 (Exhibit C - I 4-3).
(t)

Objection to Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees

dated September 6, 2007;
(u)

Notice of Appeal dated September 25, 2007;
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(v)

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion and Memorandum

of Costs and Attorneys Fees dated October 4, 2007;

(w)

Minute Entry and Order dated October II,
2007;

(x)

Memorandum Decision and Order Denying in Part and Granting in

Part Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees dated October 25,
2007;

6.

(y)

Amended Judgment dated october 30,2007;

(z)

Notice of Cross-Appeal dated November 2,2007

Service. I certify:
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Clerk of

the District Court;
(b) That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been
paid;
(c) That the Appellant filing fee has been paid;
(d) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20 I.A.R.

94

DATED this & day of December, 2007

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ~

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, and
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, individually,

Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Respondents,
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL
SECOND AMENDED

CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal
Corporation,

Appeal from:

Sixth Judicial District, Franklin County
Honorable Don L. Harding

Case number from court: CV-06-390
Order or judgment appealed from:

Memorandum Decision and Order Denying
in Part and Granting in Part Defendant's Motion for
Costs and Attorney Fees and Amended Judgment

Attorney for Appellant:

Steven R. Fuller
Steven R. Fuller Law Office
PO Box 191
Preston, ID 83263

Attorney for Respondent:

Clyde G. Nelson
Attorney at Law
PO Box 797
Soda Springs, ID 83276
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Supreme Court No. 34644
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Appeal by: Plaintiffs
Appeal against: Defendants
Notice of Appeal filed:. September 25, 2007
Notice of Cross Appeal filed: November 2, 2007
Notice of Amended Notice of Appeal filed: December 10, 2007
Appellate fee paid: Yes
Request for additional (clerk's) record filed: No
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No
Was reporter's transcript requested? No
Name of reporter: Dorothy Snarr
Dated this

'tothday of December, 2007.
V. ELLIOTT LARSEN
B

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL- 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVJCE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED NOTICE
of December, 2007.
OF APPEAL was served on the &day
By:

On:
Clerk of the District Court
Franklin County, Idaho
39 East Oneida
Preston, ID 83263
Clyde G. Nelson
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 797
Soda Springs, ID 83276
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, and
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, individually,

vs .

Supreme Court No. 34644

/

CLERKS CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL

CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal
Corporation,

I, V. Elliott Larsen, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of the
State of ldaho, in and for the County of Franklin, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction
as, and is a true, full and correct record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of
the ldaho Appellate Rules.
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause,
will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's
Transcript and Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the ldaho Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
said Court at Preston, Idaho, this 8'h day of January, 2008.

V. ELLIOTT LARSEN
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
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'rinkla Hampton, ~epu'tyClerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, and
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, individually,

Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Respondents,

Supreme Court No. 34644

1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal
Corporation,

I, V. Elliott Larsen, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Franklin, do hereby certify that I have personally
served or mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the CLERK'S RECORD to each of
the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
Steven R. Fuller
Steven R. Fuller Law Office
PO Box 191
Preston, ID 83263

Clyde G. Nelson
Attorney at Law
PO Box 797
Soda Springs, ID 83276

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the
said Court this
day of January, 2008.
LERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
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